Bug#741065: ITP: etcd-- A highly-available key value store for shared configuration and service discovery

2014-03-07 Thread Jelmer Vernooij
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Jelmer Vernooij * Package name: etcd Version : 0.3.0 * URL : https://github.com/coreos/etcd * License : Apachev2 Programming Lang: Go Description : A highly-available key value store for shared configuration and se

Bug#741054: ITP: gtkextra -- useful set of widgets for creating GUI's for GTK+

2014-03-07 Thread Georges Khaznadar
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Georges Khaznadar * Package name: gtkextra Version : 3.1.0 Upstream Author : Adrian E. Feiguin * URL : http://gtkextra.sourceforge.net/cms/ * License : LGPL-2 Programming Lang: C++, flex, bison Description : use

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Julien Cristau
On Fri, Mar 7, 2014 at 18:41:02 +0100, Jakub Wilk wrote: > * Vincent Danjean , 2014-03-07, 15:41: > >>hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc// > >>directories but their own. > > > >Even that is strange. I just tried. Processus that are not mine > >are not shown anymore by ps, but even som

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Kevin Chadwick
previously on this list Matthias Urlichs contributed: > > I did a „setcap cap_sys_ptrace+eip > > /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs”, but a normal user can’t still > > check for running programs of another user. > > > > What did I wrong? > > > check_procs is a script, not a "real" executable.

Re: Roll call for porters of architectures in sid and testing

2014-03-07 Thread Svante Signell
On Thu, 2014-03-06 at 04:20 +0100, Guillem Jover wrote: > Hi! > > On Tue, 2013-10-01 at 00:49:17 +0200, Guillem Jover wrote: > > I am an active porter for the following architectures and I intend > > to continue this for the lifetime of the jessie release: (about kfreebsd and hurd) > > I am a DD.

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Jakub Wilk
* Stephan Seitz , 2014-03-07, 15:25: But I think capabilities are a safer solution than s-bit. Maybe, maybe not. Many capabilities, including CAP_SYS_PTRACE, can be easily elevated to full root. Adding capabilities to software that wasn't specifically designed to deal with them is a bad ide

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Jakub Wilk
* Vincent Danjean , 2014-03-07, 15:41: hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc// directories but their own. Even that is strange. I just tried. Processus that are not mine are not shown anymore by ps, but even some of mine disappeared! (mostly urxvt ones) $ ls -l /usr/bin/urxvt -rwxr

Re: debian/copyright: how extensive ...

2014-03-07 Thread Osamu Aoki
Hi, On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 10:29:31PM +0100, Joerg Jaspert wrote: > On 13507 March 1977, Osamu Aoki wrote: > > Is there any rules in place written somewhere? > > If one takes it all the way to the end, then each and every file ought > to be documented. This, however, is not realistic, especially

Bug#741030: ITP: zsh-antigen -- manage your zsh plugins

2014-03-07 Thread Michael Fladischer
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Michael Fladischer -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 * Package name: zsh-antigen Version : 1 Upstream Author : Shrikant Sharat Kandula * URL : https://github.com/zsh-users/antigen * License : Expat Progr

Bug#741029: ITP: redo -- a top-down software build system

2014-03-07 Thread Nils Dagsson Moskopp
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: Nils Dagsson Moskopp * Package name: redo Version : 0.0.1 Upstream Author : Nils Dagsson Moskopp * URL : http://news.dieweltistgarnichtso.net/bin/ * License : AGPLv3+ Programming Lang: Bourne shell Description :

Bug#741028: ITP: capstone -- lightweight multi-platform, multi-architecture disassembly framework

2014-03-07 Thread David Martínez Moreno
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: "David Martínez Moreno" * Package name: capstone Version : 2.1 Upstream Author : Nguyen Anh Quynh * URL : http://www.capstone-engine.org/ * License : BSD Programming Lang: C, Java, Python Description : lightweigh

Bug#741021: RFA: keybinder -- registers global key bindings for applications

2014-03-07 Thread Luca Falavigna
Package: wnpp Severity: normal X-Debbugs-CC: debian-devel@lists.debian.org I request an adopter for keybinder source package. It should be in a decent state, upstream is not very active lately, but he's always been very responsive. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-devel-requ...@lists.debian.

Bug#741022: RFA: kupfer -- fast and lightweight desktop summoner/launcher

2014-03-07 Thread Luca Falavigna
Package: wnpp Severity: normal X-Debbugs-CC: debian-devel@lists.debian.org I request an adopter for kupfer source package. It should be in a decent state, upstream is not very active lately, but he's always been very responsive. Package is maintained under Python Application Team umbrella, bonus

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Vincent Danjean
On 05/03/2014 22:33, Jakub Wilk wrote: > hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc// directories but their > own. Even that is strange. I just tried. Processus that are not mine are not shown anymore by ps, but even some of mine disappeared! (mostly urxvt ones) See this example (the [] in t

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Stephan Seitz
On Fri, Mar 07, 2014 at 02:51:41PM +0100, Matthias Urlichs wrote: I did a „setcap cap_sys_ptrace+eip /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs”, but a normal user can’t still check for running programs of another user. What did I wrong? check_procs is a script, not a "real" executable. Wrong. [stse@

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Matthias Urlichs
Hi, Stephan Seitz: > I did a „setcap cap_sys_ptrace+eip > /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs”, but a normal user can’t still > check for running programs of another user. > > What did I wrong? > check_procs is a script, not a "real" executable. Since starting an interpreter with capabilities (

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Stephan Seitz
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 04:32:34PM +0100, Guido Günther wrote: Luckily this is not the case. :) root can see other users' /proc entries just fine. Perhaps the documentation should be improved. I should have checked the code first. If I read that correctly CAP_SYS_PTRACE is necessary here. I've f

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Stephan Seitz
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:21:06PM +1100, Craig Small wrote: On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:54:00AM +0100, Vincent Danjean wrote: I'm not sure I will let this setup (hidepid=1) on my computers. My current POV (that can change) is that I prefer to be able to do the maximum of thing as a normal user

Bug#741011: ITP: getdns -- modern asynchronous DNS API

2014-03-07 Thread Ondřej Surý
Package: wnpp Severity: wishlist Owner: "Ondřej Surý" -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 * Package name: getdns Version : 0.1.0 Upstream Author : NLnet Labs, Verisign Labs and No Mountain Software * URL : http://getdnsapi.net * License : BSD Progr

Re: Bits from the Security Team

2014-03-07 Thread Moritz Muehlenhoff
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 05:33:42AM +0100, Matthias Klose wrote: > Am 06.03.2014 02:00, schrieb Paul Wise: > >> * The distribution hardening using dpkg-buildflags is coming along > >> nicely. > > > > Unfortunately this doesn't apply to binaries compiled outside of the > > package building system.