probably not line up nearly as well once, for example,
> auth.log gets rotated, or I log in from an uncommon machine which
> doesn't have RSA access, and I mistype my password.
>
> > > Justin
>
> On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 10:15:18PM -0700, Greg Webster wrote:
> >
Hi Justin,
Part of what I'd like to (dis)prove is that they are making a 'second
run' from this or another machine to hit that accounts that it believes
are valid...any chance you could keep your testing up for a while?
Thx,
Greg
On Mon, 2005-20-06 at 23:15 -0400, Justin Pryzby wrote:
> Includ
:58 -0400, Justin Pryzby wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 17, 2005 at 01:13:14PM -0400, pryzbyj wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 17, 2005 at 09:59:45AM -0700, Greg Webster wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2005-06-17 at 12:51 -0400, Justin Pryzby wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jun 17, 2005 at 09:14:04AM -0700, G
On Fri, 2005-06-17 at 13:46 -0400, Justin Pryzby wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 17, 2005 at 10:33:49AM -0700, Greg Webster wrote:
> > On Fri, 2005-06-17 at 13:13 -0400, Justin Pryzby wrote:
> > > > Definitely would be a good test...I'd like to see someone validate what
> > &
the users have a valid shell to access the server via
ssh, yet certain accounts get many more attempts (ignoring 'root'
entirely, since it'd be a known target).
Cheers,
Greg
--
Greg Webster - System Administrator
-
intouch.ca gastips.com epredict
On Fri, 2005-06-17 at 12:51 -0400, Justin Pryzby wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 17, 2005 at 09:14:04AM -0700, Greg Webster wrote:
> > Package: ssh
> > Version: 1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.4
> > Severity: critical
> > File: /usr/sbin/sshd
> > Tags: security
> > Justification:
Package: ssh
Version: 1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.4
Severity: critical
File: /usr/sbin/sshd
Tags: security
Justification: root security hole
Due to the delay that is caused by password checking, once ssh
determines that the login attempt is for a valid account, attackers can
statistically prove the existenc
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