Bug#640389: debianutils: tempfile security exposure with TMPFILE environment variable

2011-09-04 Thread Michael Gilbert
Jonathan Nieder wrote: > [1] The crux in bug #635849 is that if the user is allowed to > influence TMPDIR or the template argument then the filename returned > by tempfile and mktemp cannot be trusted not to contain shell > metacharacters; but properly quoting all variables is already good > policy

Bug#640389: debianutils: tempfile security exposure with TMPFILE environment variable

2011-09-04 Thread Jonathan Nieder
Hi, Michael Gilbert wrote: > debianutil's tempfile (and coreutil's mktemp as well) expose security > issues when an attacker has control of the TMPFILE environment variable. > I believe that support for this variable should be disabled. Note that > scripts that expect to set the tmpfile director

Bug#640389: debianutils: tempfile security exposure with TMPFILE environment variable

2011-09-04 Thread Michael Gilbert
package: debianutils version: 4.0.2 severity: important tags: security Hi, debianutil's tempfile (and coreutil's mktemp as well) expose security issues when an attacker has control of the TMPFILE environment variable. I believe that support for this variable should be disabled. Note that scripts