Bug#534908: possibly symlink attack due to client-connect script

2017-10-03 Thread Jörg Frings-Fürst
Hello martin, now the temporary file is freshly created via create_temp_file (src/openvpn/misc.c) and deleted at end via platform_unlink (src/openvpn/platform.c). [quote] The command is also passed the pathname of a freshly created temporary file as the last argument (after any arguments specifi

Bug#534908: possibly symlink attack due to client-connect script

2010-01-20 Thread martin f krafft
also sprach Zygo Blaxell [2010.01.21.0848 +1300]: > Why does a simple shell script create a vulnerability here? Because it specifies the filename of a not-yet-created temporary file and expects results in there. -- .''`. martin f. krafft Related projects: : :' : proud Debian develop

Bug#534908: possibly symlink attack due to client-connect script

2010-01-20 Thread Zygo Blaxell
Why does a simple shell script create a vulnerability here? A shell script should already be using code like this: set -e tmp="`mktemp`" echo "blah blah" > "$tmp" echo "more blah blah" >> "$tmp" mv -f "$tmp" "$1" for two reasons: using mktemp avoids a sym

Bug#534908: possibly symlink attack due to client-connect script

2009-06-28 Thread martin f krafft
Package: openvpn Version: 2.1~rc15-1 Severity: important Tags: security OpenVPN's --client-connect option is described as follows: --client-connect script Run script on client connection. The script is passed the common name and IP address of the just-authen