Bug#301430: Multiple exploitable race conditions in openmosixview

On 2005-04-01 02:39:57 -0500 Francesco P. Lovergine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Nice news. I'll keep an eye to the proposed patches before committing. The symlink exploit should be obviously manageable. Upstream says that he also thinks my patches fix the bug. http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/me

Bug#301430: Multiple exploitable race conditions in openmosixview

severity 301430 serious tags 301430 + patch tags 301430 + upstream tags 301430 + security thanks On Thu, Mar 31, 2005 at 08:46:41PM -0500, Hubert Chan wrote: > I believe this bug is fixed by two patches that can be found at: > http://uw-dig.uwaterloo.ca/~hy3chan/patches/openmosixview/1.5/ > (pat

Bug#301430: Multiple exploitable race conditions in openmosixview

I believe this bug is fixed by two patches that can be found at: http://uw-dig.uwaterloo.ca/~hy3chan/patches/openmosixview/1.5/ (patches 20-logdirectory.diff and 50-nonodestmp.diff). I think that they should apply cleanly without the other patches -- probably at worst with some fuzz. I'm trying

Bug#301430: Multiple exploitable race conditions in openmosixview

Package: openmosixview Severity: important Tags: security According to an advisory by Rexotec several race conditions exist in OpenMosixView that permit a malicious user to trash the filesystem of a cluster node. For full details and a demo exploit please see http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1