Re: [cryptography] using Curve p25519 cryptography for type 2(Mixmaster) and type 3(mixminion) remailer blocks

2014-01-20 Thread Mansour Moufid
On Tue, 2014-01-14 at 23:57 -0500, grarpamp wrote: > I believe there is sufficient demand to merit deployment of a > good mix network. As well as perhaps web/other intake frontends > due to the now prevalent a) dwindling free email b) demand by > mail providers for phone authentication. As for ope

Re: [cryptography] ECC curves that are safe safecurves.cr.yp.to

2014-01-20 Thread Krisztián Pintér
D. J. Bernstein (at Monday, January 20, 2014, 8:01:20 PM): > Brainpool, in particular, generated curves using a method with _some_ > details that are not explained anywhere in the Brainpool documents. let me add that nothing prevents the authors from publishing their design rationale, especiall

Re: [cryptography] ECC curves that are safe safecurves.cr.yp.to

2014-01-20 Thread D. J. Bernstein
Peter Gutmann writes (on one of the harder-to-use mailing lists): > Some of their objections seem pretty subjective though, I mean they > don't like the Brainpool curves Actually, the Brainpool curves _meet_ the rigidity requirement that you're alluding to. The SafeCurves site displays this in the

Re: [cryptography] Covering boot-time entropy hole on embedded devices

2014-01-20 Thread Clemens Ladisch
Ondrej Mikle wrote: > The HW RNG is unsuitable to be used as constant entropy source, because number > of times it can be used is limited. The limit exists because the ATSHA204 uses > some sort of EEPROM update while generating random numbers (which suggests > that > something like PRNG is used in

[cryptography] Covering boot-time entropy hole on embedded devices

2014-01-20 Thread Ondrej Mikle
Hi, I have an embedded Linux (openwrt) device here, that might suffer from the known entropy hole that caused predictable keys to be generated in past. Fortunately, the device has HW RNG (ATSHA204 to be precise). The plan is to seed /dev/urandom from the HW RNG upon boot, by feeding 512 bytes int