> Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2004 15:42:47 -0400
> From: Ian Grigg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
> from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a p
Brian McGroarty wrote:
On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particu
On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
> Trei, Peter wrote:
> >Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> >unneccesary complication.
>
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather di
On 1081373018 seconds since the Beginning of the UNIX epoch
"Paul Zuefeldt" wrote:
>
>Maybe the receipt should only allow the voter to check that his vote has
>been counted. To get the detail you could require him to appear in person
>with his receipt AND a photo ID or some such, then only allow hi
: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 3:14 PM
Subject: RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter
> Sent: Wednes
The principle here is that no one should be able to prove how
the voter voted, not even the voter.
Yes, votes need to be verified and voters are certainly one party
that can do it. However, you never want to allow the voter to
take any kind of "receipt" out of the voting station if that
rece
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 1:17 PM
> [SNIP]
>
> Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> unnecessary complication.
>
Except to those of us who don't trust the system.
Implemented correctly
> Ian Grigg[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Trei, Peter wrote:
> > Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> > unneccesary complication.
>
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather directly with
Trei, Peter wrote:
Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
unneccesary complication.
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion ("I can't prov
Major Variola (ret) wrote:
>Peter, what would be wrong with having a machine in the booth that
>prints
>any valid receipt BUT is not connected to the voting system. "To vote
>use the red machine; if you're being coerced you can use the blue
>machine
>to print as many receipts as intimidators."
>
>Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
> The company's software is designed to let voters verify that their ballots
>were properly handled. It assigns random identification numbers to ballots
>and candidates. After people vote, they get a receipt that shows
Ah, the old hack-me "contest" arrives in the electronic voting business.
I love the smell of burning snake-oil in the morning...
Cheers,
RAH
---
<http://zdnet.com.com/2102-1105_2-5186016.html?tag=printthis>
Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
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