[Beowulf] Switch recommendations and 10G to the desktop?

2009-09-13 Thread John Hearns
I'm looking for recommendations for 1 48 port, or two stacked 24 port, switches for desktop users. The aim is to bond 2xgigabit connections. I would have normally first thought Nortel for this job. Thoughts? Secondly, do folks here have much experience of 10gig to the desktop? Distance is a bit to

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Joe Landman
Leif Nixon wrote: Joe Landman writes: I won't fisk this, other than to note most of the exploits we have cleaned up for our customers, have been windows based attack vectors. Contrary to the implication here, the ssh-key attack vector, while a risk, isn't nearly as dangerous as others, in acti

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Bill Broadley
Stuart Barkley wrote: > - Each user Very dangerous way to say it. Ideally you do everything possible to minimize the work of the user, that way they can't get it wrong. > creates a password-less ssh private key, puts the public I'm a fan of password-less private keys. Before the screaming beg

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Leif Nixon
Joe Landman writes: > I won't fisk this, other than to note most of the exploits we have > cleaned up for our customers, have been windows based attack vectors. > Contrary to the implication here, the ssh-key attack vector, while a > risk, isn't nearly as dangerous as others, in active use, out t

Re: [Beowulf] filesystem metadata mining tools

2009-09-13 Thread Skylar Thompson
Ashley Pittman wrote: > On Sat, 2009-09-12 at 10:10 -0500, Rahul Nabar wrote: > >> *A distribution of file age and prevelance (to know how much of this >> material is archivable). Same for frequency of access; i.e. maybe the last >> access stamp. >> > > I thought access stamps were a thing

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Reuti
Am 13.09.2009 um 12:31 schrieb Leif Nixon: This is the way to go. All our systems are set up this way. Works just fine. You just need a mechanism for maintaining host keys and ssh_known_hosts. (And remember that this doesn't work for root - you need separately set up ~root/.shosts and ~root/.ss

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Joe Landman
I started writing a long response to this, decrying security theatre in the face of real issues, but thought better of it. Much shorter version with free advice. Leif Nixon wrote: Stuart Barkley writes: - Kerberos with ssh works fine for interactive users, but doesn't seem to translate wel

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Reuti
Hi, Am 11.09.2009 um 21:39 schrieb Stuart Barkley: We are working with a couple small clusters (6-8 nodes) and will soon be working with some much larger cluster/supercomputer systems. We are currently using SGE 6.2 for job queuing. We use kerberos for authentication and ssh for system access

Re: [Beowulf] filesystem metadata mining tools

2009-09-13 Thread Ashley Pittman
On Sat, 2009-09-12 at 10:10 -0500, Rahul Nabar wrote: > *A distribution of file age and prevelance (to know how much of this > material is archivable). Same for frequency of access; i.e. maybe the last > access stamp. I thought access stamps were a thing of the past and everyone ran with "noatime"

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Leif Nixon
Stuart Barkley writes: > - Kerberos with ssh works fine for interactive users, but doesn't seem > to translate well to a queuing environment. Or am I missing > something? It's quite possible to use, but you do get a ticket expiry problem. > - Each user creates a password-less ssh private key,

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread Nicholas M Glykos
Hi Stuart, > - Each user creates a password-less ssh private key, puts the public > key in the authorized_hosts file and has relatively unfettered ssh > access between nodes (nfs shared home directory helps a lot). This > seems to be the most common approach. It is end-user setup/training > in

Re: [Beowulf] Intra-cluster security

2009-09-13 Thread John Hearns
2009/9/11 Stuart Barkley : > > - Each user creates a password-less ssh private key, puts the public > key in the authorized_hosts file and has relatively unfettered ssh > access between nodes (nfs shared home directory helps a lot).  This > seems to be the most common approach.  It is end-user setu