New submission from Niels Heinen :
Running the python binary without a script or using the -i flag will
start the process in interactive mode. The interactive mode requires an
external module to be loaded: readline.
Per default behavior, Python also tries to load this module from the current
working directory (see also trace below)
strcpy(0x7fff17609ed8, ".so") = 0x7fff17609ed8
fopen64("readline.so", "rb"
SYS_open("readline.so", 0, 0666) = -2
<... fopen64 resumed> )= 0
strcpy(0x7fff17609ed8, "module.so")= 0x7fff17609ed8
fopen64("readlinemodule.so", "rb"
SYS_open("readlinemodule.so", 0, 0666)
The module is imported in Modules/main.c line 663:
if ((Py_InspectFlag || ..
isatty(fileno(stdin))) {
PyObject *v;
v = PyImport_ImportModule("readline");
Why consider this a security bug: basically because you don't expect a
program to import a shared library from your current directory _unless_
you explicitly tell it to (e.g. import blah).
On a multi user system, someone could plant a malicious shared libraries
named "readline.so" in an attempt to hack a user that runs python in
interactive mode.
The risk obviously _very_ low but nevertheless worth to consider improving by,
for example, loading readline with a more strict path? (e.g. python lib
directories only?)
Niels
AN EXAMPLE:
---
The code below is compiled to readline.so and stored in /tmp:
void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _load();
void _load() {
printf("DING DONG!\n");
}
foo@foo:/tmp$ ls -l /tmp/readline.so
-rwxr-x--- 1 n nnn 7952 Mar 29 16:24 /tmp/readline.so
foo@foo:/tmp$ python
Python 2.6.5 (r265:79063, Apr 16 2010, 13:57:41)
[GCC 4.4.3] on linux2
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
DING DONG!
>>>
--
messages: 137473
nosy: Niels.Heinen
priority: normal
severity: normal
status: open
title: Readline module loading in interactive mode
type: security
versions: Python 2.6
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<http://bugs.python.org/issue12238>
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