---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 29 May 1998 02:29:50 +0200 (CEST) From: Andrea Arcangeli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: ALERT: Tiresome security hole in "xosview", RedHat5.1? (fwd) Vi faccio notare questa email su bugtraq che mi e' arrivata da pochi minuti scritta da Chris un Linux kernel developer che conosco da linux-kernel. Il problema di RH5.1 e xosview non c' e' su Debian 2.0 e Debian ha gia' tutte le Xlib fissate contro l' ultimo bug che permette di deventare root e l' ultimo samba fissato per altri bug che teoricamente avrebbero permesso di diventare root da piu' di una settiamana (mentre Chris fa notare che gli rpm Red-Hat non sono ancora arrivati). Ciao! Andrea[s] Arcangeli [translation: I bring to your attention this email from bugtraq I got a few minutes ago written by Chris, a Linux kernel developer I know fro linux-kernel. The problem in RH5.1 of xosview isn't there in Debian 2.0 and Debian already has all xlibs fixed against the latest bug that allow becoming root and the last samba fixed for other bugs that could theoretically allow to become root since more than a week (while Chris notes that fixed rpms still aren't available] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 28 May 1998 04:49:17 +0100 From: Chris Evans <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: ALERT: Tiresome security hole in "xosview", RedHat5.1? Hi, I am bemused. After some security auditing on RH5.0, I was curious as to what new suid binaries and daemons shipped with RH5.1. The first one I noticed was "xosview". God knows why it needs to be SUID; it probably doesn't but the makefile just makes the binary suid by default. Linux has /proc which has enough information that ferreting around in /dev/kmem using root privs isn't required. Or perhaps it needs to be suid root for the network load? By the way this didn't work regardless. Anyway. I ran the following highly complicated and time-consuming command on the xosview sources: grep strcpy *.cc Tricky one eh? Perhaps vaguely sensible when shipping a new SUID binary, i.e. REDHAT THINK!!!!!! Results of grep include, in Xrm.cc char userrfilename[1024]; strcpy(userrfilename, getenv("HOME")); Ohhh that's nice. Hey but wait that can't be dangerous. The author clearly knew what he/she was doing: char className[256]; strncpy(className, name, 255); // Avoid evil people out there... Appears later. I found this amusing. Anyway I hope it's apparent this is exploitable. xosview doesn't appear to drop privs. Also, that is _by no means the only vulnerable section of code_, just the stupidest bit. Temp. (and probably permanent) solution: "chmod u-s `which xosview`. Anyway well done RedHat for "blunder of the week". Still fuming, Chris PS. Whilst you're at it RedHat, fix the X libraries (new security holes just found) as well as dhcpd (remote root, well documented), glibc env vars (linux-security documented), and upgrade samba to 1.9.18p7 in an update rpm. -- PLEASE read the Red Hat FAQ, Tips, Errata and the MAILING LIST ARCHIVES! http://www.redhat.com/RedHat-FAQ /RedHat-Errata /RedHat-Tips /mailing-lists To unsubscribe: mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe" as the Subject.