On Mon, Dec 09, 2024 at 05:34:13PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > On 11/25/24 2:56 PM, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote: > > Provide a library allowing the VMM to create an event log that describes > > what is loaded into memory. During remote attestation in confidential > > computing this helps an independent verifier reconstruct the initial > > measurements of a VM, which contain the initial state of memory and > > CPUs. > > > > We provide some definitions and structures described by the Trusted > > Computing Group (TCG) in "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile > > Specification" Level 00 Version 1.06 Revision 52 [1]. This is the same > > format used by UEFI, and UEFI could reuse this log after finding it in > > as used by > > > DT or ACPI tables, but can also copy its content into a new one. > > I thought it was going to be a completely independent log. If UEFI would do > anything with it, I think it would have to replay the measurements into its > own log and extend them into all PCRs of all active PCR banks of the TPM,
UEFI does need an event log, because it will measure some images using the RMM's Realm Extensible Measurement (REM) registers, but nothing forces us to use the same log. To reuse the existing measurement infrastructure those REM registers can be mapped to the PCR numbers already used by UEFI's TPM support, like Intel did for TDX: https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-trust-domain-extension So for Arm the RIM could map to PCR[0], and the four REMs could map to PCR[1,7], PCR[2-6] etc. > but if I understand correctly then you do not use the TPM for this log at > all since you have a signature over it and defined (somewhere -- where?) > that only sha256 and sha512 are to be used for this log. The algorithm choice matches that of RMM, which only support sha256 and sha512 at the moment. But it's arbitrary. We could use any TCG algorithm for the log digests. Thanks, Jean
