On Fri, 7 Sep 2018, at 10:58, Sergey Arlashin wrote:
> Hi! 
> 
> Not long ago we started using MCollective to trigger Puppet runs and 
> execute maintenance shell commands on our servers. Everything looks good 
> so far. But I'm concerned about MC security model. 
> 
> For the middleware we are using RabbitMQ. We authenticate MCollective 
> servers against RabbitMQ with username/password pair. Also we have 
> Stunnel for middleware SSL termination. We use Puppet CA signed 
> certificates to verify MCollective servers. 
> 
> However I noticed that an attacker can easily change a hostname on a 
> compromised server. And after that the server will get registered with 
> that hostname. When I execute 
> 
> mco find 
> 
> I see it displayed with the hostname that was recently set. And the 
> hostname can be equal to any of the existing servers.
> 
> That means that if I execute a shell command via 
> 
> mco shell run -I "/existinghostnamemask/" "command" 
> 
> it will be also executed on the compromised server. The server can get 
> sensitive data that it is not supposed to have.
> 
> I hope I explained everything correctly :) 
> 
> So my question is - is there a way to avoid situations like the one I 
> described? For example if I use SSH to connect to a host, I get its 
> public key, and if the host changes, I receive an error. But probably 
> there is something like this for MCollective? 

You should use choria.io to deploy mcollective, mcollective as you deployed do 
have ways to restrict access and harden the security model - but its a LOT of 
work to setup.

Choria does all of this for you, nodes use their puppet certificates.

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