Hello,

Here is a short diff to net/sniproxy 0.9.17.

This solves a security issue found by continous fuzzing.
An attacker (or fuzzer) could craft a message with generation = UINT32_MAX, causing up to 4 billion loop iterations before the function returns. This triggered the fuzzer's timeout detection.

This probably doesn't need a backport to -stable as -stable is using a version which doesn't use this crypto.

Best Regards
Index: Makefile
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/ports/net/sniproxy/Makefile,v
diff -u -p -r1.13 Makefile
--- Makefile    16 Dec 2025 13:56:27 -0000      1.13
+++ Makefile    19 Dec 2025 09:25:38 -0000
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ COMMENT =       name-based proxying of HTTPS w
 
 GH_ACCOUNT =   renaudallard
 GH_PROJECT =   sniproxy
-GH_TAGNAME =   0.9.16
+GH_TAGNAME =   0.9.17
 
 CATEGORIES =   net
 
Index: distinfo
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/ports/net/sniproxy/distinfo,v
diff -u -p -r1.9 distinfo
--- distinfo    16 Dec 2025 13:56:27 -0000      1.9
+++ distinfo    19 Dec 2025 09:25:38 -0000
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SHA256 (sniproxy-0.9.16.tar.gz) = 6FHywjIHDwbA7jkpxibhEqLSqcCs9JPCMNTPFaUFi6I=
-SIZE (sniproxy-0.9.16.tar.gz) = 366744
+SHA256 (sniproxy-0.9.17.tar.gz) = 7IfhFQMVW07L2G0mrf34bQmtT4hFQxqDY8Yp3oh5s8g=
+SIZE (sniproxy-0.9.17.tar.gz) = 367381

Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature

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