dxbjavid commented on PR #3609: URL: https://github.com/apache/thrift/pull/3609#issuecomment-4857518086
good points, all three addressed. reworded the PR description to stick to neutral functional language, so it now says what the code does rather than framing the class of the issue. on the threat-model cross-check: i went through `doc/thrift-threat-model.md`. this doesn't move any trust boundary or change a default. the client peer is already untrusted by the model, and ยง9 D3 records that the default container/string limit is `INT32_MAX` and that operators are expected to set finite limits before exposing a server. all this does is make the non-strict message name honour the `max_string_size` the operator has already configured, the same as `read_bytes` and `read_string` do, so the non-strict path stops being a gap in that operator-facing control. on the coverage note: added `must_allow_non_strict_message_name_at_limit`, which feeds a non-strict name of exactly the configured limit and asserts it is accepted (name, type and seq all read back). so the boundary is pinned on both sides now, `>` and not `>=`. full lib suite passes, fmt clean. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected]
