From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 13:02:55 +0100
> During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been
> noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps
> when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size
> (specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes.
>
> In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and
> used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function
> array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ...
>
> memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
>
> ... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from
> map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER)
> and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size).
> Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds.
>
> Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we
> access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack.
>
> Since 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an
> official release yet, it only affects priviledged users.
>
> In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs
> from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also
> from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to
> user, so nothing could leak.
>
> [1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller
>
> Fixes: 28fbcfa08d8e ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps")
> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
