On Thu, 14 Jan 2021 21:26:28 +0100 Andrea Parri (Microsoft) wrote: > For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious > behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V > has sent to the guest. Ensure that invalid values cannot cause indexing > off the end of an array, or subvert an existing validation via integer > overflow. Ensure that outgoing packets do not have any leftover guest > memory that has not been zeroed out. > > Reported-by: Juan Vazquez <[email protected]> > Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]> > Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> > Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> > Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> > Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> > Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> > Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> > Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]> > Cc: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> > Cc: John Fastabend <[email protected]> > Cc: KP Singh <[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected] > Cc: [email protected] > --- > Applies to 5.11-rc3 (and hyperv-next).
So this is for hyperv-next or should we take it via netdev trees? > Changes since v1 (Juan Vazquez): > - Improve validation in rndis_set_link_state() and rndis_get_ppi() > - Remove memory/skb leak in netvsc_alloc_recv_skb()
