On 1/8/18 8:38 AM, Edward Cree wrote:
On 05/01/18 23:02, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
since commit 82abbf8d2fc4 the verifier rejects the bit-wise
arithmetic on pointers earlier.
The test 'dubious pointer arithmetic' now has less output to match on.
Adjust it.

Fixes: 82abbf8d2fc4 ("bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c | 22 +---------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c 
b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
index 8591c89c0828..471bbbdb94db 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
@@ -474,27 +474,7 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
                .result = REJECT,
                .matches = {
                        {4, "R5=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0)"},
-                       /* ptr & 0x40 == either 0 or 0x40 */
-                       {5, "R5=inv(id=0,umax_value=64,var_off=(0x0; 0x40))"},
-                       /* ptr << 2 == unknown, (4n) */
-                       {7, 
"R5=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372036854775804,umax_value=18446744073709551612,var_off=(0x0;
 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
-                       /* (4n) + 14 == (4n+2).  We blow our bounds, because
-                        * the add could overflow.
-                        */
-                       {8, "R5=inv(id=0,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
-                       /* Checked s>=0 */
-                       {10, 
"R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 
0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
-                       /* packet pointer + nonnegative (4n+2) */
-                       {12, 
"R6=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 
0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
-                       {14, 
"R4=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 
0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
-                       /* NET_IP_ALIGN + (4n+2) == (4n), alignment is fine.
-                        * We checked the bounds, but it might have been able
-                        * to overflow if the packet pointer started in the
-                        * upper half of the address space.
-                        * So we did not get a 'range' on R6, and the access
-                        * attempt will fail.
-                        */
-                       {16, 
"R6=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 
0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+                       /* R5 bitwise operator &= on pointer prohibited */
                }
        },
        {
Rather than neutering this test, we should change it to keep the part where
 it tests that a large pkt_ptr offset prevents us getting a reg->range.
Specifically, in this test we have
    r2 = pkt
    r5 = large unknown scalar
    r6 = r2 + r5
    r4 = r6 + 4
Then we check r4 < pkt_end, which normally would give r6->range = 4, but in
 this case must not do so since r6 could be (u64)(-2) in which case r4 = 2
 < pkt_end despite r6 not pointing into the packet.
AFAICT there is not other coverage of this case in test_align, and I don't
 recall such a test being in test_verifier either.  So please instead replace
 the insns that do prohibited ops on pointers with some other way of creating
 a large unknown scalar, and keep the rest of the test case intact.

makes sense. will send a follow up patch when security dust settles.

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