This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in seg6_validate_srh() when the trailing data is less than sizeof(struct sr6_tlv).
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyk...@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyk...@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.leb...@uclouvain.be> --- net/ipv6/seg6.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6.c b/net/ipv6/seg6.c index a855eb3..5f44ffe 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6.c @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ bool seg6_validate_srh(struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh, int len) struct sr6_tlv *tlv; unsigned int tlv_len; + if (trailing < sizeof(*tlv)) + return false; + tlv = (struct sr6_tlv *)((unsigned char *)srh + tlv_offset); tlv_len = sizeof(*tlv) + tlv->len; -- 2.10.2