On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 04:49:17PM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote: > On 09/24/2016 08:01 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > >This prevent future potential pointer leaks when an unprivileged eBPF > >program will read a pointer value from its context. Even if > >is_valid_access() returns a pointer type, the eBPF verifier replace it > >with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register value that contains a kernel address is > >then allowed to leak. Moreover, this fix allows unprivileged eBPF > >programs to use functions with (legitimate) pointer arguments. > > > >Not an issue currently since reg_type is only set for PTR_TO_PACKET or > >PTR_TO_PACKET_END in XDP and TC programs that can only be loaded as > >privileged. For now, the only unprivileged eBPF program allowed is for > >socket filtering and all the types from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE. > >However, this fix is important for future unprivileged eBPF programs > >which could use pointers in their context. > > > >Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net> > >Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <a...@kernel.org> > >Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net> > > Seems okay to me: > > Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <a...@kernel.org> Mickael, please mention [PATCH net-next] in subject next time. Thanks
