On 07/13/2016 12:18 AM, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>Dccp verifies packet integrity, including length, at initial rcv in dccp_invalid_packet, later pulls headers in dccp_enqueue_skb. A call to sk_filter in-between can cause __skb_pull to wrap skb->len. skb_copy_datagram_msg interprets this as a negative value, so (correctly) fails with EFAULT. The negative length is reported in ioctl SIOCINQ or possibly in a DCCP_WARN in dccp_close. Introduce an sk_receive_skb variant that caps how small a filter program can trim packets, and call this in dccp with the header length. Excessively trimmed packets are now processed normally and queued for reception as 0B payloads. Fixes: 7c657876b63c ("[DCCP]: Initial implementation") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
LGTM, thanks Willem! Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
