Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 2:34 AM, Barry Shein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>> The lesson one should get from all this is that the ultimate harm
>> of spammers et al is that they are succeeding in corrupting the
>> idea of a standards-based internet.
huh? i think that, with their attacks, they are actually helping to
drive improvements in the standards. of course, the disfunction of
the standards organizations does not make this as clean a process and as
much of a win as it could be. but considering that security was not
very thoroughly designed in the original standards, we're not doing all
that badly. it's always gonna be a chase.
> The lesson here is that different groups at the same ISPs go to
> different places
i am not sure that is so much a lesson as an observation. the lesson
may be, in part, that this is sub-optimal. can it be changed? how?
> Packet pushers go to *NOG. And the abuse desks mostly all go to
> MAAWG. And any CERTs / security types the ISP has go to FIRST and
> related events. And most of them never do coordinate internally, run
> by different groups probably in different cities ...
"dear coo/ceo/whomever: i want approval to send the five folk who go to
nanog, and the five folk who go to maawg, and the five folk who go to
first to *all* go to the new frobnitz joint conference."
think that'll fly?
otoh, being on the frobnitz program committee would be an interesting
lesson and exercise in industry physics.
when i first joined acm ('67), i could keep up with a significant
portion of the literature. now i maybe see a single digit percentage.
the field has broadened. the ops and other applied areas have similarly
broadened and specialized. we are victims of our own success.
randy
