In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Stuart Henderson writes:
> On 2006/11/23 17:07, Igor Sobrado wrote:
> ...
> > to set up a firewall with an ever-growing list of hostile machines.
> ...
> 
> I think you misunderstand me. I mean to restrict direct SSH access
> to only those networks which need access, not to block attackers when
> you see them. Authorized users would either connect from an approved
> IP address, or by using authpf. (for this, I'm assuming use of a
> separate firewall to protect a number of other machines, not 'self-
> protecting').

You are right, I misunderstand you.  We have a similar setup at the
machines at FCSI, in Illinois.  It is very secure, but somewhat
restrictive.  I certainly prefer opening the ssh service to the
world on a bastion host.  If that machine is attacked, only other
servers in the DMZ are at risk... well, the second firewall can
be attacked too.

> There aren't a lot of cases where you need to leave SSH access
> open to the world.

You are right, carefully choosing the address ranges that will be
allowed there is not a need to leave ssh open to the world.  Even
if remote root access is disabled (it is usually disabled on my
computers) there is a risk of a user john having a password john...

I like your proposal a lot but, honestly, I am surprised by the elegant
method proposed by Steve.  With only a few opportunities to guess the
right password it seems that a brute force attack is not possible
at all (except with a highly distributed brute force attack, of
course, but it is out of the abilities of the standard intruders.)

I will consider both your proposal and Steve's one.

Thanks a lot for this excellent advice!

Igor.

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