linux-security-module  

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• • [AppArmor 15/47] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rmdir LSM hook John
  • [AppArmor 16/47] Call lsm hook before unhashing dentry in vfs_rmdir() John
  • [AppArmor 17/47] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_unlink() John
  • [AppArmor 18/47] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_unlink LSM hook John
  • [AppArmor 19/47] Add struct vfsmount parameters to vfs_rename() John
  • [AppArmor 20/47] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rename LSM hook John
  • [AppArmor 21/47] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_setxattr() John
  • [AppArmor 22/47] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_setxattr LSM hook John
  • [AppArmor 23/47] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_getxattr() John
  • [AppArmor 24/47] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_getxattr LSM hook John
  • [AppArmor 25/47] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_listxattr() John
  • [AppArmor 26/47] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_listxattr LSM hook John
  • [AppArmor 27/47] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_removexattr() John
  • [AppArmor 28/47] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_removexattr LSM hook John
  • [AppArmor 29/47] Fix __d_path() for lazy unmounts and make it unambiguous John
  • [AppArmor 30/47] Make d_path() consistent across mount operations John
  • [AppArmor 31/47] Add d_namespace_path() to compute namespace relative pathnames John
  • [AppArmor 33/47] VFS: new fsetattr() file operation John
  • [AppArmor 32/47] From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> John
  • [AppArmor 36/47] Allow permission functions to tell between parent and leaf checks John
  • [AppArmor 35/47] Factor out sysctl pathname code John
  • [AppArmor 39/47] Fix file_permission() John
  • [AppArmor 38/47] Switch to vfs_permission() in sys_fchdir() John
  • [AppArmor 40/47] Export audit subsystem for use by modules John
  • [AppArmor 42/47] AppArmor: Module and LSM hooks John
  • [AppArmor 41/47] AppArmor: Main Part John
  • [AppArmor 43/47] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching John
  • [AppArmor 44/47] AppArmor: all the rest John
  • [AppArmor 45/47] Add AppArmor LSM to security/Makefile John
  • [AppArmor 46/47] add simple network toggles to apparmor John
  • [AppArmor 37/47] Switch to vfs_permission() in do_path_lookup() John
  • [AppArmor 47/47] --- Documentation/lsm/AppArmor-Security-Goal.txt | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 134 insertions(+) John
  • [AppArmor 34/47] Pass struct file down the inode_*xattr security LSM hooks John
• Re: [patch, rfc] mm.h, security.h, key.h and preventing namespace poisoning James Morris
  • Re: [patch, rfc] mm.h, security.h, key.h and preventing namespace poisoning David Chinner
  • Re: [patch, rfc] mm.h, security.h, key.h and preventing namespace poisoning James Morris
  • Re: [patch, rfc] mm.h, security.h, key.h and preventing namespace poisoning Andrew Morton
  • Re: [patch, rfc] mm.h, security.h, key.h and preventing namespace poisoning James Morris
  • Re: [patch, rfc] mm.h, security.h, key.h and preventing namespace poisoning David Howells
  • Re: [patch, rfc] mm.h, security.h, key.h and preventing namespace poisoning Eric Paris
• [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Eric Paris
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Eric Paris
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Willy Tarreau
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Greg KH
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Eric Paris
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Willy Tarreau
  • Re: [PATCH] Allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Greg KH
• [RFC PATCH v8 00/18] Update to the labeled networking patches for 2.6.25 Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 12/18] SELinux: Add new peer permissions to the Flask definitions Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 09/18] SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindex Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 09/18] SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindex Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 09/18] SELinux: Only store the network interface's ifindex Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook James Morris
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 05/18] LSM: Add secctx_to_secid() LSM hook Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 02/18] NetLabel: Cleanup the LSM domain hash functions Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 15/18] SELinux: Allow NetLabel to directly cache SIDs Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 18/18] SELinux: Add network ingress and egress control permission checks Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 17/18] NetLabel: Add auditing to the static labeling mechanism Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 04/18] NetLabel: Add secid token support to the NetLabel secattr struct Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 11/18] SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22 Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 08/18] SELinux: Convert the netif code to use ifindex values Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 13/18] SELinux: Better integration between peer labeling subsystems Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 16/18] NetLabel: Introduce static network labels for unlabeled connections Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions James Morris
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 10/18] SELinux: Add a network node caching mechanism similar to the sel_netif_*() functions Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 03/18] NetLabel: Consolidate the LSM domain mapping/hashing locks Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 01/18] NetLabel: Remove unneeded RCU read locks Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 06/18] LSM: Add inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook Paul Moore
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 06/18] LSM: Add inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v8 06/18] LSM: Add inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 07/18] NetLabel: Add IP address family information to the netlbl_skbuff_getattr() function Paul Moore
  • [RFC PATCH v8 14/18] SELinux: Enable dynamic enable/disable of the network access checks Paul Moore
• Defuzzing the LSM interface Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH] (2.6.24-rc4-mm1) -mm Smack getpeercred_stream fix for SO_PEERSEC and TCP Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH 00/28] Permit filesystem local caching [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/28] KEYS: Increase the payload size when instantiating a key [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/28] KEYS: Check starting keyring as part of search [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/28] KEYS: Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/28] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security label [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/28] Security: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/28] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 09/28] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • Re: [PATCH 09/28] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 09/28] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Karl MacMillan
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Karl MacMillan
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Crispin Cowan
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Crispin Cowan
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] James Morris
  • Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 10/28] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management [try #2] Nick Piggin
  • [PATCH 11/28] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 16/28] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitored [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 14/28] CacheFiles: Be consistent about the use of mapping vs file->f_mapping in Ext3 [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 17/28] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 15/28] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single page of data to an inode [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 19/28] NFS: Use local caching [try #2] David Howells
  • [PATCH 20/28] NFS: Configuration and mount option changes to enable local caching on NFS [try #2] David Howells

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