On Wed, 9 Jan 2008, Andrew Morgan wrote: > So far the objection (thanks Stephen for the historical context!) seems > to be "potential for abuse": > > ~ <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > [PATCH] remove sys_security > > I've been auditing the LSM stuff a bit more.. > > They have registered an implemented a syscall, sys_security > that does nothing but switch into the individual modules > based on the first argument, i.e. it's ioctl() switching > on the security module instead of device node. Yuck. > > Patch below removes it (no intree users), maybe selinux/etc > folks should send their actual syscall for review instead.. > > Since SELinux is now 'in-tree', is this class of objection now moot?
Class of objection to a sys_security, or to the prctl override? If the former, I think it would still be considered a poor option, as multiplexor syscalls are generally seen as such for several reasons. I don't think SELinux would need to use it now if it came back. As Stephen mentioned, the prctl override might also be seen as a means to revector/hijack the syscall. I should mention that I'm still not clear on why you need to have a permissive version of this hook. - James -- James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
