Hi Jarkko

On 9/1/26 6:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Sat, Aug 29, 2026 at 06:39:17PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.

Define a trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in the private member of
trusted_key_options.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
---
Changelog:
  v4:
   - Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were
     merged
   - Resolved the resulting merge conflicts

  v3:
   - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed
     in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")

  v2:
   - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
   - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private
   - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean
     up patch)
   - Address other minor comments from Jarkko

  include/keys/trusted-type.h               | 11 ---
  include/keys/trusted_tpm.h                | 14 ++++
  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++---------
  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------
  4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
struct trusted_key_options {
        uint16_t keytype;
-       uint32_t keyhandle;
-       unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       uint32_t blobauth_len;
-       unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
-       unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
-       int pcrlock;
-       uint32_t hash;
-       uint32_t policydigest_len;
-       unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       uint32_t policyhandle;
        void *private;
  };
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
index 3a0fa3bc8454..98d638d13ecb 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; +struct trusted_tpm_options {
To be aligned with existing convention a better name would be "trusted_key_tpm".


Sure, will make this change and send out v5.

Thanks,
Srish.



+       uint32_t keyhandle;
+       unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       uint32_t blobauth_len;
+       unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
+       unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+       int pcrlock;
+       uint32_t hash;
+       uint32_t policydigest_len;
+       unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       uint32_t policyhandle;
+};
+
  int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
                      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
                      struct trusted_key_options *options);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c 
b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index bf0bf7f36970..14d005e76a1c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {
  #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
  static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
+
        if (!trusted_debug)
                return;
pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
-       pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
-       pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
-       pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+       pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
+       pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
+       pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
        print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-                            16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+                            16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
  }
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
@@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
  static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
                    struct trusted_key_options *o)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
        int ret;
struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
        /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
        p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
- ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+       ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
                       p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
-                      o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+                      private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
+                      private->pcrinfo_len);
        if (ret < 0)
                pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
@@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
  static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
                      struct trusted_key_options *o)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
        int ret;
struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE); - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
-                        o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+       ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
+                        p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
        if (ret < 0)
                pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
        else
@@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
  static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
                      struct trusted_key_options *opt)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private;
        substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
        char *p = c;
        int token;
@@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
*pay,
        if (tpm2 < 0)
                return tpm2;
- opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+       private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
if (!c)
                return 0;
@@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
*pay,
switch (token) {
                case Opt_pcrinfo:
-                       opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
-                       if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+                       private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+                       if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
                                return -EINVAL;
-                       res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
-                                     opt->pcrinfo_len);
+                       res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
+                                     private->pcrinfo_len);
                        if (res < 0)
                                return -EINVAL;
                        break;
@@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
*pay,
                        if (res < 0)
                                return -EINVAL;
                        opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
-                       opt->keyhandle = handle;
+                       private->keyhandle = handle;
                        break;
                case Opt_keyauth:
                        if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
                                return -EINVAL;
-                       res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
+                       res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
                                      SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
                        if (res < 0)
                                return -EINVAL;
@@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
*pay,
                         * hex strings.  TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
                         * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
                         */
-                       opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+                       private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
- if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
-                               res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+                       if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+                               res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
                                              TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
                                if (res < 0)
                                        return -EINVAL;
- opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+                               private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
                                break;
                        }
- if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
-                               memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
-                                      opt->blobauth_len);
+                       if (tpm2 &&
+                           private->blobauth_len <=
+                           sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
+                               memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
+                                      private->blobauth_len);
                                break;
                        }
@@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
                        res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
                        if (res < 0)
                                return -EINVAL;
-                       opt->pcrlock = lock;
+                       private->pcrlock = lock;
                        break;
                case Opt_hash:
                        if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
                                return -EINVAL;
                        for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
                                if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
-                                       opt->hash = i;
+                                       private->hash = i;
                                        break;
                                }
                        }
@@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
*pay,
                        }
                        break;
                case Opt_policydigest:
-                       digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+                       digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
                        if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
                                return -EINVAL;
-                       res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
+                       res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
                                      digest_len);
                        if (res < 0)
                                return -EINVAL;
-                       opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
+                       private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
                        break;
                case Opt_policyhandle:
                        if (!tpm2)
@@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
*pay,
                        res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
                        if (res < 0)
                                return -EINVAL;
-                       opt->policyhandle = handle;
+                       private->policyhandle = handle;
                        break;
                default:
                        return -EINVAL;
@@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload 
*pay,
static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private;
        struct trusted_key_options *options;
        int tpm2;
@@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
                /* set any non-zero defaults */
                options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
- if (!tpm2)
-                       options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+               private = kzalloc_obj(*private);
+               if (!private) {
+                       kfree_sensitive(options);
+                       options = NULL;
+               } else {
+                       if (!tpm2)
+                               private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+                       options->private = private;
+               }
        }
        return options;
  }
static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
        struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
        int ret = 0;
        int tpm2;
@@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, 
char *datablob)
                goto out;
        dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+       private = options->private;
+       if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
                ret = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }
@@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload 
*p, char *datablob)
                goto out;
        }
- if (options->pcrlock) {
-               ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+       if (private->pcrlock) {
+               ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
                if (ret < 0) {
                        pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
                        goto out;
                }
        }
  out:
+       if (options)
+               kfree_sensitive(options->private);
        kfree_sensitive(options);
        return ret;
  }
static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
        struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
        int ret = 0;
        int tpm2;
@@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload 
*p, char *datablob)
                goto out;
        dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+       private = options->private;
+       if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
                ret = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
        }
@@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload 
*p, char *datablob)
        if (ret < 0)
                pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- if (options->pcrlock) {
-               ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+       if (private->pcrlock) {
+               ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
                if (ret < 0) {
                        pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
                        goto out;
                }
        }
  out:
+       if (options)
+               kfree_sensitive(options->private);
        kfree_sensitive(options);
        return ret;
  }
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c 
b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 67225dd562a9..07b831b515bb 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload 
*payload,
                           struct trusted_key_options *options,
                           u8 *src, u32 len)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
        const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
        u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
        u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload 
*payload,
        work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
                               asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
- if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+       if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
                unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
                /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
                w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload 
*payload,
                goto err;
        }
- work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+       work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
        work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
        work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
                           struct trusted_key_options *options,
                           u8 **buf)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
        int ret;
        struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
        u8 *blob;
@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload 
*payload,
                return -ENOMEM;
*buf = blob;
-       options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+       private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
        blob += ctx.priv_len;
@@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
                      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
                      struct trusted_key_options *options)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
        off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
        struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
        struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
@@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
        u32 flags;
        int rc;
- hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
+       hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
        if (hash < 0)
                return hash;
- if (!options->keyhandle)
+       if (!private->keyhandle)
                return -EINVAL;
rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
@@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE); - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+       rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
        if (rc)
                goto out;
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
-                                   options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+                                   private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
-       tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
+       tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len);
- if (options->blobauth_len)
-               tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+       if (private->blobauth_len)
+               tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
        tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
@@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* key properties */
        flags = 0;
-       flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+       flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
        flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | 
TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
        tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
/* policy */
-       tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
-       if (options->policydigest_len)
-               tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, 
options->policydigest_len);
+       tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len);
+       if (private->policydigest_len)
+               tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest,
+                              private->policydigest_len);
/* public parameters */
        tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
@@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
                         u32 *blob_handle)
  {
        u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
        struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
        unsigned int private_len;
        unsigned int public_len;
@@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
        }
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
-       if (!options->keyhandle)
+       if (!private->keyhandle)
                return -EINVAL;
/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
@@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
        tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
        tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+       rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
        if (rc)
                return rc;
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
+       tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth,
                                    TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
@@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
                           struct trusted_key_options *options,
                           u32 blob_handle)
  {
+       struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
        struct tpm_header *head;
        struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
        u16 data_len;
@@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
        if (rc)
                return rc;
- if (!options->policyhandle) {
+       if (!private->policyhandle) {
                tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
-                                           options->blobauth,
-                                           options->blobauth_len);
+                                           private->blobauth,
+                                           private->blobauth_len);
        } else {
                /*
                 * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
@@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
                 * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
                 * password.
                 */
-               tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle,
+               tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
                                     NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
-                                    options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+                                    private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
                if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
                        tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
                                                    NULL, 0);
--
2.53.0

BR, Jarkko

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