<[email protected]>,[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected] From: Nicolas Belouin <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]>
On October 21, 2017 6:03:02 PM GMT+02:00, "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote: >Quoting Nicolas Belouin ([email protected]): >> with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to >> flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted >> xattr is near zero. >> CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as >> entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It >> would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs. > >You say "for example". Are you intending to add more uses? If so, >what >are they? If not, how about renaming it CAP_TRUSTED_XATTR? > I don't see any other use for now, but I don't want it to be too narrow and non usable in a similar context in the future. So I believe the underlying purpose of marking a process as "trusted" (even if for now it only means rw permission on trusted xattr) is more meaningful. >What all does allowing writes to trusted xattrs give you? There are >the overlayfs whiteouts, what else? Nicolas
