3.16.49-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <[email protected]> commit c54590cac51db8ab5fd30156bdaba34af915e629 upstream. Userspace application can do a hypercall through /dev/xen/privcmd, and some for some hypercalls argument is a pointers to user-provided structure. When SMAP is supported and enabled, hypervisor can't access. So, lets allow it. The same applies to HYPERVISOR_dm_op, where additionally privcmd driver carefully verify buffer addresses. Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: drop change in HYPERVISOR_dm_op()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> --- --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> +#include <asm/smap.h> #include <xen/interface/xen.h> #include <xen/interface/sched.h> @@ -213,10 +214,12 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call, __HYPERCALL_DECLS; __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); + stac(); asm volatile("call *%[call]" : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) : __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5); + clac(); return (long)__res; }
