On Sun, Jun 26, 2016 at 02:55:33PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of
Nits: do_exit() > recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow s/ in do_exit// > do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack. The latter gives Append "()" to the function names. > us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a > stack overflow to write out our logs. > > I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that > disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks. This way, if we need to > revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack > overflow handling. > > Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> > --- ... > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c > index 352f022cfd5b..0d05f113805e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c > @@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ unsigned long oops_begin(void) > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oops_begin); > NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin); > > +extern void __noreturn rewind_stack_do_exit(int signr); You don't need the "extern" here. > + > void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) > { > if (regs && kexec_should_crash(current)) -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
