On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 02:29:24PM +0000, David Howells wrote: > Rename ->digest and ->digest_len to ->m and ->m_size to represent the input > to the signature verification algorithm, reflecting that ->digest may no > longer actually *be* a digest. > > Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> > cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]> > cc: Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]> > cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> > cc: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]> > cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> > cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> > cc: [email protected] > cc: [email protected] > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 4 ++-- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 28 ++++++++++++------------ > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 3 +-- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 2 +- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 10 ++++----- > include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++-- > security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 ++-- > 7 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > index 348966ea2175..2326743310b1 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c > @@ -593,10 +593,10 @@ static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct > kernel_pkey_params *params, > { > struct public_key_signature sig = { > .s_size = params->in2_len, > - .digest_size = params->in_len, > + .m_size = params->in_len, > .encoding = params->encoding, > .hash_algo = params->hash_algo, > - .digest = (void *)in, > + .m = (void *)in, > .s = (void *)in2, > }; > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > index 6d6475e3a9bf..aa085ec6fb1c 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c > @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo); > > /* The digest was calculated already. */ > - if (sig->digest) > + if (sig->m) > return 0; > > if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo) > @@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); > > desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); > - sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); > + sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); > > ret = -ENOMEM; > - sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!sig->digest) > + sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!sig->m) > goto error_no_desc; > > desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); > @@ -59,11 +59,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > desc->tfm = tfm; > > /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */ > - ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, > - sig->digest); > + ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, sig->m); > if (ret < 0) > goto error; > - pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest); > + pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m); > > /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a > * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the > @@ -78,14 +77,14 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > goto error; > } > > - if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) { > + if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->m_size) { > pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n", > sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len); > ret = -EBADMSG; > goto error; > } > > - if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest, > + if (memcmp(sig->m, sinfo->msgdigest, > sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) { > pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n", > sinfo->index); > @@ -98,7 +97,8 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we > * hash it. > */ > - memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size); > + memset(sig->m, 0, sig->m_size); > + > > ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); > if (ret < 0) > @@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > if (ret < 0) > goto error; > ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs, > - sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest); > + sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->m); > if (ret < 0) > goto error; > - pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest); > + pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m); > } > > error: > @@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const > u8 **buf, u32 *len, > if (ret) > return ret; > > - *buf = sinfo->sig->digest; > - *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size; > + *buf = sinfo->sig->m; > + *len = sinfo->sig->m_size; > > i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, > sinfo->sig->hash_algo); > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > index e5b177c8e842..a46356e0c08b 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > @@ -425,8 +425,7 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key > *pkey, > if (ret) > goto error_free_key; > > - ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size, > - sig->digest, sig->digest_size); > + ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size, sig->m, sig->m_size); > > error_free_key: > kfree_sensitive(key); > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c > index 041d04b5c953..f4ec126121b3 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c > @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature > *sig) > for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->auth_ids); i++) > kfree(sig->auth_ids[i]); > kfree(sig->s); > - kfree(sig->digest); > + kfree(sig->m); > kfree(sig); > } > } > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c > b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c > index 79cc7b7a0630..3854f7ae4ed0 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c > @@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) > } > > desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); > - sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); > + sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); > > ret = -ENOMEM; > - sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!sig->digest) > + sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!sig->m) > goto error; > > desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); > @@ -76,9 +76,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) > > desc->tfm = tfm; > > - ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, > - sig->digest); > - > + ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->m); > if (ret < 0) > goto error_2; > > diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h > index 81098e00c08f..bd38ba4d217d 100644 > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h > @@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key); > struct public_key_signature { > struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[3]; > u8 *s; /* Signature */ > - u8 *digest; > + u8 *m; /* Message data to pass to verifier */ > u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */ > - u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ > + u32 m_size; /* Number of bytes in ->m */ > const char *pkey_algo; > const char *hash_algo; > const char *encoding; > diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c > b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c > index 457c0a396caf..87be85f477d1 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c > +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c > @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char > *sig, > goto out; > } > > - pks.digest = (u8 *)data; > - pks.digest_size = datalen; > + pks.m = (u8 *)data; > + pks.m_size = datalen; > pks.s = hdr->sig; > pks.s_size = siglen; > ret = verify_signature(key, &pks); >
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> BR, Jarkko
