On 5/28/24 17:08, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
* Asymmetric TPM2 RSA key with signing and verification.
* Encryption and decryption when pcks1 encoding is used.
* Enabled with CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_ECDSA_SUBTYPE.
s/ECDSA/RSA !
Signed-off-by: James Prestwood <prest...@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jar...@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jar...@kernel.org>
---
v6:
* Validate RSA parameters, and also that the blob has space for
them.
* Fix tpm2_key_rsa_destroy() memory corruption: cast to tpm2_key_rsa
* Allocate temporary buffers from heap.
* Rename tpm2_key_rsa_extract_pub to tpm2_key_rsa_probe.
* While pre-parsing, return -EBADMSG when the probing fails. This
translates to "not detected" for the framework, i.e. should not
be considered as an error but instead "move on". E.g. TPM_ALG_RSA
is checked and if it is instead TPM_ALG_ECDSA, then it is passed
to that module.
v5:
* akcipher has two *undocumented* parameters. Document this clearly.
* Remove unused variable.
v4:
* Just put the values to the buffer instead of encoding them.
* Adjust buffer sizes.
* Make tpm2_rsa_key_encode() not to allocate from heap and simplify
the serialization.
v3:
* Drop the special case for null handle i.e. do not define policy.
* Remove extra empty line.
v2:
* Remove two spurios pr_info() messsages that I forgot to remove.
* Clean up padding functions and add additional checks for length
also in tpm2_unpad_pcks1().
* Add the missing success check kzalloc() in tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt().
* Check that params->out_len for capacity before copying the result.
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 15 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c | 678 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/tpm.h | 2 +
4 files changed, 696 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index e1345b8f39f1..9d88c1190621 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
select MPILIB
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
+ select CRYPTO_RSA
select CRYPTO_SIG
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
@@ -23,6 +24,20 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available.
ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable.
+config ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_RSA_SUBTYPE
+ tristate "Asymmetric TPM2 RSA crypto algorithm subtype"
+ depends on TCG_TPM
+ select CRYPTO_RSA
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ select CRYPTO_TPM2_KEY
+ select ASN1
+ help
+ This option provides support for asymmetric TPM2 key type handling.
+ If signature generation and/or verification are to be used,
+ appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-256) must be available.
+ ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable.
+
s/requisite/required ?
config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
tristate "X.509 certificate parser"
depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index bc65d3b98dcb..c6da84607824 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := \
signature.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_RSA_SUBTYPE) += tpm2_key_rsa.o
#
# X.509 Certificate handling
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c
b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4bc322580037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* TPM2 asymmetric public-key crypto subtype
+ *
+ * Asymmetric TPM2 RSA key:
+ * - Decrypts RSA with TPM2_RSA_Decrypt.
+ * - Signs with PKCS#1 1.5 padding. Signing is implemented with
+ * TPM2_RSA_Decrypt operation.
+ * - Encrypts with the akcipher rsa-pcks1pad.
s/pcks1pad/pkcs1pad !
+ *
+ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.h>
+#include <crypto/tpm2_key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tpm2_key_rsa: "fmt
+
+#define PKCS1_PAD_MIN_SIZE 11
+
+/* TPM2 Structures 12.2.3.5: TPMS_RSA_PARMS */
+struct tpm2_rsa_parms {
+ __be16 symmetric;
+ __be16 scheme;
+ __be16 key_bits;
+ __be32 exponent;
+ __be16 modulus_size;
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * Fill the data with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
+ */
+static int tpm2_pad_pkcs1(const u8 *in, int in_len, u8 *out, int out_len)
+{
+ unsigned int prefix_len = out_len - in_len - 3;
+
+ if (in_len > out_len - PKCS1_PAD_MIN_SIZE)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ /* prefix */
+ out[0] = 0;
+ out[1] = 1;
+ memset(&out[2], 0xff, prefix_len);
+ out[2 + prefix_len] = 0;
+ /* payload */
+ memcpy(&out[2 + prefix_len + 1], in, in_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3447 - Section 7.2.2
+ * Size of the input data should be checked against public key size by
+ * the caller.
+ */
+static const u8 *tpm2_unpad_pkcs1(const u8 *in, int in_len, int *out_len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (in[0] != 0 || in[1] != 2)
+ return NULL;
+
+ i = 2;
+ while (in[i] != 0 && i < in_len)
+ i++;
+
+ if (i == in_len || i < (PKCS1_PAD_MIN_SIZE - 1))
+ return NULL;
+
+ *out_len = in_len - i - 1;
+ return in + i + 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Outputs the cipher algorithm name on success, and retuns -ENOPKG
+ * on failure.
+ */
+static int tpm2_key_get_akcipher(const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo,
+ char *cipher)
+{
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+ if (!hash_algo) {
+ strcpy(cipher, "pkcs1pad(rsa)");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = snprintf(cipher, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)",
+ hash_algo);
+ if (ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") == 0) {
+ strcpy(cipher, "rsa");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOPKG;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_encode(const struct tpm2_key *key, u8 *buf)
+{
+ const off_t o = key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*key->desc);
+ const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *p =
+ (const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *)&key->data[o];
+ const u16 mod_size = be16_to_cpu(p->modulus_size);
+ const void *mod = &key->data[o + sizeof(*p)];
+
+ u8 *start = &buf[4];
+ u8 *work = &buf[4];
+ u32 seq_len;
+
+ work[0] = 0x02; /* INTEGER */
+ work[1] = 0x82; /* u16 */
+ work[2] = mod_size >> 8;
+ work[3] = mod_size & 0xff;
+ work = &work[4];
+ memcpy(work, mod, mod_size);
+ work = &work[mod_size];
+ work[0] = 0x02; /* INTEGER */
+ work[1] = 3; /* < 128 */
+ work[2] = 1; /* 65537 */
+ work[3] = 0;
+ work[4] = 1;
+ work = &work[5];
+ seq_len = work - start;
+ buf[0] = 0x30; /* SEQUENCE */
+ buf[1] = 0x82; /* u16 */
+ buf[2] = seq_len >> 8;
+ buf[3] = seq_len & 0xff;
+
+ /*
+ * ABI requires this according include/crypto/akcipher.h, which says
according to
+ * that there is epilogue with algorithm OID and parameters length.
is an epilogue
+ * Neither size nor semantics is documented *anywhere*, and there's no
+ * struct to hold them.
+ *
+ * So zeroing out the last eight bytes after the key blob seems like the
+ * best bet, given no better (or any) information. The size of the
+ * parameters (two u32's) was found from crypto/asymmetric/public_key.c.
+ */
+ memset(work, 0, 8);
+
+ return seq_len + 4;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encryption operation is performed with the public key. Hence it is done
+ * in software
+ */
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_encrypt(struct tpm2_key *key,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ const void *in, void *out)
+{
+ char cipher[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct scatterlist in_sg, out_sg;
+ struct akcipher_request *req;
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+ struct crypto_wait cwait;
+ u8 *buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ buf = kzalloc(TPM2_KEY_BYTES_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = tpm2_key_get_akcipher(params->encoding, params->hash_algo,
cipher);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_buf;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(cipher, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto err_buf;
+ }
+
+ ret = tpm2_key_rsa_encode(key, buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, ret);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_tfm;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&in_sg, in, params->in_len);
+ sg_init_one(&out_sg, out, params->out_len);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &in_sg, &out_sg, params->in_len,
+ params->out_len);
+
+ crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
+ akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ crypto_req_done, &cwait);
+
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &cwait);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = req->dst_len;
+
+ akcipher_request_free(req);
+
+err_tfm:
+ crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+
+err_buf:
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct tpm2_key *key,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ const void *in, int in_len, void *out)
+{
+ u32 key_handle = 0;
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ u16 decrypted_len;
+ u8 *pos;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); > + if (ret)
if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
+ if (ret)
Uh, this one can return TPM error codes it seems from
tpm_transmit_cmd()? You probably have to do something with ret here in
case it's positive because I saw a caller of __tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt
relying on ret < 0 as error.
+ goto err_ops;
+
+ ret = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_auth;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, key->parent, NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION |
+ TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, &key->data[0], key->priv_len + key->pub_len);
+ if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+ ret = -E2BIG;
+ goto err_buf;
+ }
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+ ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "TPM2_CC_LOAD");
+ ret = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, ret);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err_buf;
+ }
+ key_handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+
+ tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, key_handle, NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, in_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, in, in_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+ ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "TPM2_RSA_DECRYPT");
+ ret = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, ret);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err_blob;
+ }
+
+ pos = buf.data + TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4;
+ decrypted_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)pos);
+ pos += 2;
+
+ if (params->out_len < decrypted_len) {
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto err_blob;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, pos, decrypted_len);
+ ret = decrypted_len;
+
+err_blob:
+ tpm2_flush_context(chip, key_handle);
+
+err_buf:
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+err_auth:
+ if (ret < 0)
+ tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+
+err_ops:
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_key *key,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ const void *in, void *out)
+{
+ const u8 *ptr;
+ int out_len;
+ u8 *work;
+ int ret;
+
+ work = kzalloc(TPM2_KEY_BYTES_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!work)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = __tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(chip, key, params, in, params->in_len,
+ work);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ptr = tpm2_unpad_pkcs1(work, ret, &out_len);
+ if (!ptr) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (out_len > params->out_len) {
I suppose params->out_len describes the size of void *out buffer..
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, ptr, out_len);
+ kfree(work);
+ return out_len;
+
+err:
+ kfree(work);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sign operation is an encryption using the TPM's private key. With RSA the
+ * only difference between encryption and decryption is where the padding goes.
+ * Since own padding can be used, TPM2_RSA_Decrypt can be repurposed to do
+ * encryption.
+ */
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_sign(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_key *key,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ const void *in, void *out)
+{
+ const off_t o = key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*key->desc);
+ const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *p =
+ (const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *)&key->data[o];
+ const u16 mod_size = be16_to_cpu(p->modulus_size);
+ const struct rsa_asn1_template *asn1;
+ u32 in_len = params->in_len;
+ void *asn1_wrapped = NULL;
+ u8 *padded;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1") != 0) {
+ ret = -ENOPKG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (params->hash_algo) {
+ asn1 = rsa_lookup_asn1(params->hash_algo);
+ if (!asn1) {
+ ret = -ENOPKG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Request enough space for the ASN.1 template + input hash */
+ asn1_wrapped = kzalloc(in_len + asn1->size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!asn1_wrapped) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy ASN.1 template, then the input */
+ memcpy(asn1_wrapped, asn1->data, asn1->size);
+ memcpy(asn1_wrapped + asn1->size, in, in_len);
+
+ in = asn1_wrapped;
+ in_len += asn1->size;
+ }
+
+ /* with padding: * > + padded = kmalloc(mod_size, GFP_KERNEL);
check NULL pointer?
+ tpm2_pad_pkcs1(in, in_len, padded, mod_size);
+ ret = __tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(chip, key, params, padded, mod_size, out);
+ kfree(padded);
+
+err:
+ kfree(asn1_wrapped);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void tpm2_key_rsa_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
+ struct seq_file *m)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+
+ if (!key) {
+ pr_err("key blob missing");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ seq_puts(m, "TPM2/RSA");
+}
+
+static void tpm2_key_rsa_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key *key = payload0;
+
+ if (!key)
+ return;
This seems unnecessary.
+
+ kfree(key);
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ const void *in, void *out)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key *key = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = tpm_default_chip();
+
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ switch (params->op) {
+ case kernel_pkey_encrypt:
+ return tpm2_key_rsa_encrypt(key, params, in, out);
+ case kernel_pkey_decrypt:
+ return tpm2_key_rsa_decrypt(chip, key, params, in, out);
+ case kernel_pkey_sign:
+ return tpm2_key_rsa_sign(chip, key, params, in, out);
Missing verify here?
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_verify(const struct key *key,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+ const struct tpm2_key *tpm2_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+ char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct akcipher_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+ struct crypto_wait cwait;
+ u8 *buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sig->digest)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ ret = tpm2_key_get_akcipher(sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo, alg_name);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ buf = kzalloc(TPM2_KEY_BYTES_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto err_buf;
+ }
+
+ ret = tpm2_key_rsa_encode(tpm2_key, buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, ret);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size);
+ sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
+ sig->digest_size);
+ crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
+ akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ crypto_req_done, &cwait);
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait);
+
+ akcipher_request_free(req);
+
+err_tfm:
+ crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+
+err_buf:
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ struct kernel_pkey_query *info)
+{
+ const struct tpm2_key *key = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+ const off_t o = key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*key->desc);
+ const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *p =
+ (const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *)&key->data[o];
+ const u16 mod_size = be16_to_cpu(p->modulus_size);
+ char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+ unsigned int len;
+ u8 *buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tpm2_key_get_akcipher(params->encoding, params->hash_algo,
alg_name);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ buf = kzalloc(TPM2_KEY_BYTES_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto err_buf;
+ }
+
+ ret = tpm2_key_rsa_encode(key, buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, ret);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_tfm;
+
+ len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
+
+ info->key_size = mod_size * 8;
+ info->max_data_size = mod_size;
+ info->max_sig_size = len;
+ info->max_enc_size = len;
+ info->max_dec_size = mod_size;
+
+ info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN | KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY;
+
+ if (!strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1")) {
+ pr_info("pkcs1\n");
+ info->supported_ops =
+ KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT | KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
+ }
+
+err_tfm:
+ crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+ return ret;
+
+err_buf:
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct asymmetric_key_subtype tpm2_key_rsa_subtype = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .name = "tpm2_key_rsa",
+ .name_len = sizeof("tpm2_key_rsa") - 1,
+ .describe = tpm2_key_rsa_describe,
+ .destroy = tpm2_key_rsa_destroy,
+ .query = tpm2_key_rsa_query,
+ .eds_op = tpm2_key_rsa_eds_op,
+ .verify_signature = tpm2_key_rsa_verify,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_key_rsa_subtype);
+
+static int __tpm2_key_rsa_preparse(struct tpm2_key *key)
+{
+ const off_t o = key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*key->desc);
+ const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *p =
+ (const struct tpm2_rsa_parms *)&key->data[o];
+
+ if (tpm2_key_type(key) != TPM_ALG_RSA)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (tpm2_key_policy_size(key) != 0)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (be16_to_cpu(p->symmetric) != TPM_ALG_NULL)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (be16_to_cpu(p->scheme) != TPM_ALG_NULL)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (be16_to_cpu(p->key_bits) != 2048 &&
+ be16_to_cpu(p->key_bits) != 3072 &&
+ be16_to_cpu(p->key_bits) != 4096)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (be32_to_cpu(p->exponent) != 0x00000000 &&
+ be32_to_cpu(p->exponent) != 0x00010001)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ pr_debug("modulus_size=%u\n", be16_to_cpu(p->modulus_size));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as a TPM private key blob.
+ */
+static int tpm2_key_rsa_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key *key;
+ int ret;
+
+ key = tpm2_key_decode(prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return ret;
+
+ if (key->oid != OID_TPMLoadableKey) {
+ kfree(key);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ ret = __tpm2_key_rsa_preparse(key);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(key);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &tpm2_key_rsa_subtype;
+ prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
+ prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = key;
+ prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL;
+ prep->quotalen = 100;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct asymmetric_key_parser tpm2_key_rsa_parser = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .name = "tpm2_key_rsa_parser",
+ .parse = tpm2_key_rsa_preparse,
+};
+
+static int __init tpm2_key_rsa_init(void)
+{
+ return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm2_key_rsa_parser);
+}
+
+static void __exit tpm2_key_rsa_exit(void)
+{
+ unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm2_key_rsa_parser);
+}
+
+module_init(tpm2_key_rsa_init);
+module_exit(tpm2_key_rsa_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Asymmetric TPM2 RSA key");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 21a67dc9efe8..d0860af7a56d 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum tpm2_session_types {
/* if you add a new hash to this, increment TPM_MAX_HASHES below */
enum tpm_algorithms {
TPM_ALG_ERROR = 0x0000,
+ TPM_ALG_RSA = 0x0001,
TPM_ALG_SHA1 = 0x0004,
TPM_ALG_AES = 0x0006,
TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH = 0x0008,
@@ -271,6 +272,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E,
TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153,
TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157,
+ TPM2_CC_RSA_DECRYPT = 0x0159,
TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_UPDATE = 0x015C,
TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E,
TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161,
