* Asymmetric TPM2 ECDSA key with signing and verification.
* Enabled with CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_ECDSA_SUBTYPE.

Cc: Stefan Berger <stef...@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jar...@kernel.org>
---
v6:
* Very first version.
* Stefan: any idea why the signature give -EKEYREJECTED?
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig          |  15 +
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile         |   1 +
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_ecdsa.c | 441 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/ecdsa.c                          |   1 -
 include/linux/tpm.h                     |   6 +
 5 files changed, 463 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_ecdsa.c

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 9d88c1190621..c97f11e0340c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
          appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available.
          ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable.
 
+config ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_ECDSA_SUBTYPE
+       tristate "Asymmetric TPM2 ECDSA crypto algorithm subtype"
+       depends on TCG_TPM
+       select CRYPTO_ECDSA
+       select CRYPTO_SHA256
+       select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+       select CRYPTO_TPM2_KEY
+       select ASN1
+       select ASN1_ENCODER
+       help
+         This option provides support for asymmetric TPM2 key type handling.
+         If signature generation and/or verification are to be used,
+         appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-256) must be available.
+         ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable.
+
 config ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_RSA_SUBTYPE
        tristate "Asymmetric TPM2 RSA crypto algorithm subtype"
        depends on TCG_TPM
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index c6da84607824..0843d2268a69 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ asymmetric_keys-y := \
        signature.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_ECDSA_SUBTYPE) += tpm2_key_ecdsa.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_TPM2_KEY_RSA_SUBTYPE) += tpm2_key_rsa.o
 
 #
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_ecdsa.c 
b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_ecdsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ad99984440fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/tpm2_key_ecdsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Asymmetric TPM2 ECDSA key subtype.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
+ */
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/ecc.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/tpm2_key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tpm2_key_ecdsa: "fmt
+
+struct tpm2_ecc_parms {
+       __be16 symmetric;
+       __be16 scheme;
+       __be16 ecc;
+       __be16 kdf;
+};
+
+static const u8 *tpm2_key_ecdsa_ecc_x(const struct tpm2_key *key)
+{
+       const off_t o = key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*key->desc);
+
+       return &key->data[o + sizeof(struct tpm2_ecc_parms)];
+}
+
+static const u8 *tpm2_key_ecdsa_ecc_y(const struct tpm2_key *key)
+{
+       const u8 *x = tpm2_key_ecdsa_ecc_x(key);
+       u16 x_size = get_unaligned_be16(&x[0]);
+
+       /* +2 from the size field: */
+       return &x[2 + x_size];
+}
+
+static void tpm2_key_ecdsa_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
+                                   struct seq_file *m)
+{
+       struct tpm2_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+
+       if (!key) {
+               pr_err("key missing");
+               return;
+       }
+
+       seq_puts(m, "TPM2/ECDSA");
+}
+
+static void tpm2_key_ecdsa_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
+{
+       struct tpm2_key *key = payload0;
+
+       if (!key)
+               return;
+
+       kfree(key);
+}
+
+static const char *tpm2_ecc_name(u16 ecc)
+{
+       const char *name;
+
+       switch (ecc) {
+       case TPM2_ECC_NIST_P521:
+               name = "ecdsa-nist-p521";
+               break;
+       case TPM2_ECC_NIST_P384:
+               name = "ecdsa-nist-p384";
+               break;
+       default:
+               name = "ecdsa-nist-p256";
+               break;
+       }
+
+       return name;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_ecdsa_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+                               struct kernel_pkey_query *info)
+{
+       const struct tpm2_key *key = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+       const off_t o = key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*key->desc);
+       const struct tpm2_ecc_parms *p =
+               (const struct tpm2_ecc_parms *)&key->data[o];
+       u16 ecc = be16_to_cpu(p->ecc);
+       const char *ecc_name = tpm2_ecc_name(ecc);
+       const u8 *x = tpm2_key_ecdsa_ecc_x(key);
+       u16 x_size = get_unaligned_be16(&x[0]);
+       struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+       char data[256];
+       u8 *ptr;
+       int ret;
+
+       memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+       tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(ecc_name, 0, 0);
+       if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+               return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+       /* Probe for ecdsa_set_pub_key(): */
+       ptr = &data[0];
+       *ptr++ = 0x04; /* uncompressed */
+       memcpy(&ptr[0], &x[2], x_size);
+       memcpy(&ptr[x_size], &x[2 + x_size + 2], x_size);
+       ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, data, 2 * x_size + 1);
+       crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+
+       info->max_sig_size = 256;
+       info->key_size = 256;
+       info->max_data_size = 256;
+       info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN | KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY;
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_ecdsa_sign(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_key *key,
+                              struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+                              const void *in, void *out)
+{
+       off_t offset = sizeof(struct tpm_header) + 4;
+       u16 hash_algo = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
+       u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       u32 in_len = params->in_len;
+       struct tpm_buf buf;
+       u16 digest_size;
+       u32 key_handle;
+       u8 *ptr = out;
+       u16 sig_algo;
+       int ret;
+
+       /* Require explicit hash algorithm: */
+       if (!params->hash_algo)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       /* Currently only support SHA256: */
+       if (!!strcmp(params->hash_algo, "sha256"))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
+
+       ret = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
+       if (ret)
+               goto err_ops;
+
+       ret = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+               goto err_ops;
+       }
+
+       tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, key->parent, NULL);
+       tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION |
+                                   TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
+       tpm_buf_append(&buf, &key->data[0], key->priv_len + key->pub_len);
+       if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+               tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+               ret = -E2BIG;
+               goto err_buf;
+       }
+       tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+       ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "ECDSA loading");
+       ret = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, ret);
+       if (ret) {
+               tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+               ret = -EIO;
+               goto err_buf;
+       }
+
+       key_handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+
+       tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SIGN);
+       tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, key_handle, NULL);
+       tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0);
+
+       sha256(in, in_len, digest);
+       tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       tpm_buf_append(&buf, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_ECDSA);
+       tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
+
+       /* 10.7.2 A NULL Ticket */
+       tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ST_HASHCHECK);
+       tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL);
+       tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+       tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+       ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "ECDSA signing");
+       ret = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, ret);
+       if (ret) {
+               tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+               ret = -EIO;
+               goto err_blob;
+       }
+
+       ret = -EIO;
+       sig_algo = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+       if (sig_algo != TPM_ALG_ECDSA)
+               goto err_blob;
+
+       hash_algo = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+       if (hash_algo != TPM_ALG_SHA256)
+               goto err_blob;
+
+       digest_size = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+       if (digest_size != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+               goto err_blob;
+
+       /* SEQUENCE */
+       *ptr++ = 0x30;
+       *ptr++ = 2 * (2 + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       /* INTEGER */
+       *ptr++ = 0x02;
+       *ptr++ = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+       memcpy(ptr, &buf.data[offset], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       offset += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+       ptr += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+
+       digest_size = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset);
+       if (digest_size != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+               goto err_blob;
+
+       /* INTEGER */
+       *ptr++ = 0x02;
+       *ptr++ = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+       memcpy(ptr, &buf.data[offset], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       offset += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+       ptr += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+
+       ret = (void *)ptr - out;
+       pr_info("ret=%d\n", ret);
+
+err_blob:
+       tpm2_flush_context(chip, key_handle);
+
+err_buf:
+       tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+err_ops:
+       tpm_put_ops(chip);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_ecdsa_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+                                const void *in, void *out)
+{
+       struct tpm2_key *key = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+       struct tpm_chip *chip = tpm_default_chip();
+
+       if (!chip)
+               return -ENODEV;
+
+       switch (params->op) {
+       case kernel_pkey_sign:
+               return tpm2_key_ecdsa_sign(chip, key, params, in, out);
+       default:
+               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+       }
+}
+
+static int tpm2_key_ecdsa_verify_signature(const struct key *key,
+                                          const struct public_key_signature 
*sig)
+{
+       const struct tpm2_key *tpm2_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+       const off_t o = tpm2_key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*tpm2_key->desc);
+       const struct tpm2_ecc_parms *p =
+               (const struct tpm2_ecc_parms *)&tpm2_key->data[o];
+       u16 ecc = be16_to_cpu(p->ecc);
+       const char *ecc_name = tpm2_ecc_name(ecc);
+       const u8 *x = tpm2_key_ecdsa_ecc_x(tpm2_key);
+       u16 x_size = get_unaligned_be16(&x[0]);
+       struct akcipher_request *req;
+       struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
+       struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+       struct crypto_wait cwait;
+       char data[256];
+       u8 *ptr;
+       int ret;
+
+       memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
+
+       tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(ecc_name, 0, 0);
+       if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+               return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+       /* Probe for ecdsa_set_pub_key(): */
+       ptr = &data[0];
+       *ptr++ = 0x04; /* uncompressed */
+       memcpy(&ptr[0], &x[2], x_size);
+       memcpy(&ptr[x_size], &x[2 + x_size + 2], x_size);
+       ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, data, 2 * x_size + 1);
+       if (ret)
+               goto err_tfm;
+
+       ret = -ENOMEM;
+       req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!req)
+               goto err_tfm;
+
+       sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
+       sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size);
+       sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+       akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
+                                  sig->digest_size);
+       crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
+       akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+                                     CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+                                     crypto_req_done, &cwait);
+       ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait);
+       akcipher_request_free(req);
+
+err_tfm:
+       crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Asymmetric TPM2 ECDSA key. Signs and decrypts with TPM.
+ */
+struct asymmetric_key_subtype tpm2_key_ecdsa_subtype = {
+       .owner                  = THIS_MODULE,
+       .name                   = "tpm2_key_ecdsa",
+       .name_len               = sizeof("tpm2_key_ecdsa") - 1,
+       .describe               = tpm2_key_ecdsa_describe,
+       .destroy                = tpm2_key_ecdsa_destroy,
+       .query                  = tpm2_key_ecdsa_query,
+       .eds_op                 = tpm2_key_ecdsa_eds_op,
+       .verify_signature       = tpm2_key_ecdsa_verify_signature,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_key_ecdsa_subtype);
+
+static int __tpm2_key_ecdsa_preparse(struct tpm2_key *key)
+{
+       const off_t o = key->priv_len + 2 + sizeof(*key->desc);
+       const struct tpm2_ecc_parms *p =
+               (const struct tpm2_ecc_parms *)&key->data[o];
+       u16 x_size, y_size;
+       const u8 *x, *y;
+
+       if (tpm2_key_type(key) != TPM_ALG_ECC)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       if (tpm2_key_policy_size(key) != 0)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       if (be16_to_cpu(p->symmetric) != TPM_ALG_NULL)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       if (be16_to_cpu(p->scheme) != TPM_ALG_NULL)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       if (be16_to_cpu(p->ecc) != TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256 &&
+           be16_to_cpu(p->ecc) != TPM2_ECC_NIST_P384 &&
+           be16_to_cpu(p->ecc) != TPM2_ECC_NIST_P521)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       if (be16_to_cpu(p->kdf) != TPM_ALG_NULL)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       x = tpm2_key_ecdsa_ecc_x(key);
+       x_size = get_unaligned_be16(&x[0]);
+       if (x_size > ECC_MAX_BYTES)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       y = tpm2_key_ecdsa_ecc_y(key);
+       y_size = get_unaligned_be16(&y[0]);
+       if (y_size > ECC_MAX_BYTES)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       if (x_size != y_size)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as a TPM private key blob.
+ */
+static int tpm2_key_ecdsa_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+       struct tpm2_key *key;
+       int ret;
+
+       key = tpm2_key_decode(prep->data, prep->datalen);
+       if (IS_ERR(key))
+               return ret;
+
+       if (key->oid != OID_TPMLoadableKey) {
+               kfree(key);
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+
+       ret = __tpm2_key_ecdsa_preparse(key);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               kfree(key);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &tpm2_key_ecdsa_subtype;
+       prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
+       prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = key;
+       prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL;
+       prep->quotalen = 100;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static struct asymmetric_key_parser tpm2_key_ecdsa_parser = {
+       .owner  = THIS_MODULE,
+       .name   = "tpm2_key_ecdsa_parser",
+       .parse  = tpm2_key_ecdsa_preparse,
+};
+
+static int __init tpm2_key_ecdsa_init(void)
+{
+       return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm2_key_ecdsa_parser);
+}
+
+static void __exit tpm2_key_ecdsa_exit(void)
+{
+       unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&tpm2_key_ecdsa_parser);
+}
+
+module_init(tpm2_key_ecdsa_init);
+module_exit(tpm2_key_ecdsa_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Asymmetric TPM2 ECDSA key");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c
index 258fffbf623d..cf7d630c6593 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c
@@ -236,7 +236,6 @@ static int ecdsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, 
const void *key, unsig
        if (d[0] != 4)
                return -EINVAL;
 
-       keylen--;
        digitlen = keylen >> 1;
 
        ndigits = DIV_ROUND_UP(digitlen, sizeof(u64));
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index a4be7a852bde..b70ba5962102 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ enum tpm_algorithms {
        TPM_ALG_ERROR           = 0x0000,
        TPM_ALG_RSA             = 0x0001,
        TPM_ALG_SHA1            = 0x0004,
+       TPM_ALG_HMAC            = 0x0004,
        TPM_ALG_AES             = 0x0006,
        TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH       = 0x0008,
        TPM_ALG_SHA256          = 0x000B,
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ enum tpm_algorithms {
        TPM_ALG_SHA512          = 0x000D,
        TPM_ALG_NULL            = 0x0010,
        TPM_ALG_SM3_256         = 0x0012,
+       TPM_ALG_ECDSA           = 0x0018,
        TPM_ALG_ECC             = 0x0023,
        TPM_ALG_CFB             = 0x0043,
 };
@@ -65,6 +67,8 @@ enum tpm_algorithms {
 enum tpm2_curves {
        TPM2_ECC_NONE           = 0x0000,
        TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256      = 0x0003,
+       TPM2_ECC_NIST_P384      = 0x0004,
+       TPM2_ECC_NIST_P521      = 0x0005,
 };
 
 struct tpm_digest {
@@ -239,6 +243,7 @@ enum tpm2_structures {
        TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS     = 0x8001,
        TPM2_ST_SESSIONS        = 0x8002,
        TPM2_ST_CREATION        = 0x8021,
+       TPM2_ST_HASHCHECK       = 0x8024,
 };
 
 /* Indicates from what layer of the software stack the error comes from */
@@ -274,6 +279,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
        TPM2_CC_LOAD                    = 0x0157,
        TPM2_CC_RSA_DECRYPT             = 0x0159,
        TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_UPDATE         = 0x015C,
+       TPM2_CC_SIGN                    = 0x015D,
        TPM2_CC_UNSEAL                  = 0x015E,
        TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD            = 0x0161,
        TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE            = 0x0162,
-- 
2.45.1


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