On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 17:35 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Hello Horia,
>
> On 21.03.21 21:48, Horia Geantă wrote:
> > On 3/16/2021 7:02 PM, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > [...]
> >> +struct trusted_key_ops caam_trusted_key_ops = {
> >> + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
> >> + .init = trusted_caam_init,
> >> + .seal = trusted_caam_seal,
> >> + .unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
> >> + .exit = trusted_caam_exit,
> >> +};
> > caam has random number generation capabilities, so it's worth using that
> > by implementing .get_random.
>
> If the CAAM HWRNG is already seeding the kernel RNG, why not use the kernel's?
>
> Makes for less code duplication IMO.
Using kernel RNG, in general, for trusted keys has been discussed
before. Please refer to Dave Safford's detailed explanation for not
using it [1].
thanks,
Mimi
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/bca04d5d9a3b764c9b7405bba4d4a3c035f2a...@alpmbapa12.e2k.ad.ge.com/
