On Thu, 21 Jan 2021 at 10:54, Christophe Leroy
<christophe.le...@csgroup.eu> wrote:
>
>
>
> Le 21/01/2021 à 08:31, Ard Biesheuvel a écrit :
> > On Thu, 21 Jan 2021 at 06:35, Christophe Leroy
> > <christophe.le...@csgroup.eu> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Le 20/01/2021 à 23:23, Ard Biesheuvel a écrit :
> >>> On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 at 19:59, Christophe Leroy
> >>> <christophe.le...@csgroup.eu> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Talitos Security Engine AESU considers any input
> >>>> data size that is not a multiple of 16 bytes to be an error.
> >>>> This is not a problem in general, except for Counter mode
> >>>> that is a stream cipher and can have an input of any size.
> >>>>
> >>>> Test Manager for ctr(aes) fails on 4th test vector which has
> >>>> a length of 499 while all previous vectors which have a 16 bytes
> >>>> multiple length succeed.
> >>>>
> >>>> As suggested by Freescale, round up the input data length to the
> >>>> nearest 16 bytes.
> >>>>
> >>>> Fixes: 5e75ae1b3cef ("crypto: talitos - add new crypto modes")
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.le...@csgroup.eu>
> >>>
> >>> Doesn't this cause the hardware to write outside the given buffer?
> >>
> >>
> >> Only the input length is modified. Not the output length.
> >>
> >> The ERRATA says:
> >>
> >> The input data length (in the descriptor) can be rounded up to the nearest
> >> 16B. Set the
> >> data-in length (in the descriptor) to include X bytes of data beyond the
> >> payload. Set the
> >> data-out length to only output the relevant payload (don't need to output
> >> the padding).
> >> SEC reads from memory are not destructive, so the extra bytes included in
> >> the AES-CTR
> >> operation can be whatever bytes are contiguously trailing the payload.
> >
> > So what happens if the input is not 16 byte aligned, and rounding it
> > up causes it to extend across a page boundary into a page that is not
> > mapped by the IOMMU/SMMU?
> >
>
> What is the IOMMU/SMMU ?
>
> The mpc8xx, mpc82xx and mpc83xx which embed the Talitos Security Engine don't
> have such thing, the
> security engine uses DMA and has direct access to the memory bus for reading
> and writing.
>
OK, good. So the only case where this could break is when the DMA
access spills over into a page that does not exist, and I suppose this
could only happen if the transfer involves a buffer located at the
very top of DRAM, right?
