On 6/17/19 1:09 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Using a bare block cipher in non-crypto code is almost always a bad idea,
> not only for security reasons (and we've seen some examples of this in
> the kernel in the past), but also for performance reasons.
>
> In the TCP fastopen case, we call into the bare AES block cipher one or
> two times (depending on whether the connection is IPv4 or IPv6). On most
> systems, this results in a call chain such as
>
> crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx, dst, src)
> crypto_cipher_crt(tfm)->cit_encrypt_one(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), ...);
> aesni_encrypt
> kernel_fpu_begin();
> aesni_enc(ctx, dst, src); // asm routine
> kernel_fpu_end();
>
> It is highly unlikely that the use of special AES instructions has a
> benefit in this case, especially since we are doing the above twice
> for IPv6 connections, instead of using a transform which can process
> the entire input in one go.
>
> We could switch to the cbcmac(aes) shash, which would at least get
> rid of the duplicated overhead in *some* cases (i.e., today, only
> arm64 has an accelerated implementation of cbcmac(aes), while x86 will
> end up using the generic cbcmac template wrapping the AES-NI cipher,
> which basically ends up doing exactly the above). However, in the given
> context, it makes more sense to use a light-weight MAC algorithm that
> is more suitable for the purpose at hand, such as SipHash.
>
> Since the output size of SipHash already matches our chosen value for
> TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE, and given that it accepts arbitrary input
> sizes, this greatly simplifies the code as well.
>
> NOTE: Server farms backing a single server IP for load balancing purposes
> and sharing a single fastopen key will be adversely affected by
> this change unless all systems in the pool receive their kernel
> upgrades at the same time.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheu...@linaro.org>
> ---
All our fastopen packetdrill tests pass (after I changed all the cookie values
in them)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eduma...@google.com>
