On Wed, 2017-08-02 at 14:42 -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>
> > On Thu, 2017-07-06 at 19:17 -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> >> @@ -200,18 +200,40 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> >> */
> >> int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> >> - struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> >> - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
> >> - int xattr_len, int opened)
> >> + struct file *file, const void *buf, loff_t size,
> >> + const unsigned char *filename,
> >> + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value_,
> >> + int *xattr_len_, int opened)
> >> {
> >> static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
> >> char *cause = "unknown";
> >> struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
> >> struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> >> enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> >> - int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
> >> + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = *xattr_value_;
> >> + int xattr_len = *xattr_len_, rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
> >> + bool appraising_modsig = false;
> >> + void *xattr_value_evm;
> >> + size_t xattr_len_evm;
> >> +
> >> + if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
> >> + /*
> >> + * Not supposed to happen. Hooks that support modsig are
> >> + * whitelisted when parsing the policy using
> >> + * ima_hooks_supports_modsig.
> >> + */
> >> + if (!buf || !size)
> >> + WARN_ONCE(true, "%s doesn't support modsig\n",
> >> + func_tokens[func]);
> >
> > ima _appraise_measurement() is getting kind of long. Is there any
> > reason we can't move this comment and test to ima_read_modsig()?
>
> I didn't do that because then I would need to pass func as an argument
> to ima_read_modsig just to print the warning above. But it does simplify
> the code so it may be worth it. I'll make that change in v4.
Makes sense.
> >> @@ -229,8 +251,24 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >> goto out;
> >> }
> >>
> >> - status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
> >> - if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
> >> + /*
> >> + * Appended signatures aren't protected by EVM but we still call
> >> + * evm_verifyxattr to check other security xattrs, if they exist.
> >> + */
> >> + if (appraising_modsig) {
> >> + xattr_value_evm = NULL;
> >> + xattr_len_evm = 0;
> >> + } else {
> >> + xattr_value_evm = xattr_value;
> >> + xattr_len_evm = xattr_len;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value_evm,
> >> + xattr_len_evm, iint);
> >> + if (appraising_modsig && status == INTEGRITY_FAIL) {
> >> + cause = "invalid-HMAC";
> >> + goto out;
> >
> > "modsig" is special, because having any security xattrs is not
> > required. This test doesn't prevent status from being set to
> > "missing-HMAC". This test is redundant with the original tests below.
>
> Indeed, that is wrong. I'm still a bit fuzzy about how EVM works and how
> it interacts with IMA. The only way I can think of singling out modsig
> without reintroduced the complex expression you didn't like in v2 is as
> below. What do you think?
The original code, without any extra tests, should be fine.
>
> @@ -229,8 +241,25 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
> - if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
> + /*
> + * Appended signatures aren't protected by EVM but we still call
> + * evm_verifyxattr to check other security xattrs, if they exist.
> + */
> + if (appraising_modsig) {
> + xattr_value_evm = NULL;
> + xattr_len_evm = 0;
> + } else {
> + xattr_value_evm = xattr_value;
> + xattr_len_evm = xattr_len;
> + }
> +
> + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value_evm,
> + xattr_len_evm, iint);
> + if (appraising_modsig && (status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL
> + || status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> + /* It's ok if there's no xattr in the case of modsig. */
> + ;
> + else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS && status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN) {
> if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
> || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> cause = "missing-HMAC";
>
> >> + } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS && status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN) {
> >> if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
> >> || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> >> cause = "missing-HMAC";
> >> @@ -281,6 +319,43 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >> status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> >> }
> >
> > Calling evm_verifyxattr() with the IMA xattr value prevents EVM from
> > having to re-read the IMA xattr, but isn't necessary.On modsig
> > signature verification failure, calling evm_verifyxattr() a second
> > time isn't necessary.
>
> So even for the IMA xattr sig case, the evm_verifyxattr call in
> ima_appraise_measurement is an optimization and can be skipped?
Right, it is just an optimization. The evm xattr needs to be verified
just once.
> >> + case IMA_MODSIG:
> >> + /*
> >> + * To avoid being tricked into recursion, we don't allow a
> >> + * modsig stored in the xattr.
> >> + */
> >> + if (!appraising_modsig) {
> >> + status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> >> + cause = "unknown-ima-data";
> >> +
> >> + break;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> + rc = ima_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, xattr_value);
> >> + if (!rc) {
> >> + iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
> >> + status =
> >> +
> >> + kfree(*xattr_value_);
> >> + *xattr_value_ = xattr_value;
> >> + *xattr_len_ = xattr_len;
> >> +
> >> + break;
> >> + }
> >
> > When including the appended signature in the measurement list, the
> > corresponding file hash needs to be included in the measurement list,
> > which might be different than the previously calculated file hash
> > based on the hash algorithm as defined in the IMA xattr.
> >
> > Including the file hash and signature in the measurement list allows
> I> the attestation server, with just a public key, to verify the file
> > signature against the file hash. No need for a white list.
> >
> > ima_modsig_verify() must calculate the file hash in order to verify
> > the file signature. This file hash value somehow needs to be returned
> > in order for it to be included in the measurement list.
>
> In that case, patch 6/7 "ima: Store measurement after appraisal" isn't
> enough and we have to go back to v2's change in ima_main.c which ties
> together the collect and appraise steps in process_measurement (In that
> version I called the function measure_and_appraise but it should be
> called collect_and_appraise instead). That is because if the modsig
> verification fails, the hash needs to be recalculated for the xattr
> signature verification.
> Either that, or I add another call to ima_collect_measurement inside
> ima_appraise_measurement if the modsig verification fails. Which do you
> prefer?
The file hash (without the appended signature) is already being
calculated by verify_pkcs7_message_sig(). There's no reason to
calculate it twice.
If the appended signature verification succeeds, that means the file
hash stored in the appended signature was valid. Somehow we need
access to sig->digest, sig->digest_size and sig->hash_algo, which was
compared against the calculated hash. Refer to
public_key_verify_signature().
Mimi
