Am Donnerstag, 28. Mai 2015, 22:08:06 schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
> This patch converts the low-level __gcm-aes-aesni algorithm to
> the new AEAD interface.
>
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au>
> ---
>
> arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 246
> +++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 167
> deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
> b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c index 5660a18..c5fa1e6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
> @@ -44,13 +44,18 @@
> #endif
>
>
> +#define AESNI_ALIGN 16
> +#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))
> +#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16
> +
> /* This data is stored at the end of the crypto_tfm struct.
> * It's a type of per "session" data storage location.
> * This needs to be 16 byte aligned.
> */
> struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx {
> - u8 hash_subkey[16];
> - struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded;
> + u8 hash_subkey[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
> + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded
> + __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
> u8 nonce[4];
> };
>
> @@ -65,10 +70,6 @@ struct aesni_hash_subkey_req_data {
> struct scatterlist sg;
> };
>
> -#define AESNI_ALIGN (16)
> -#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1))
> -#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16
> -
> struct aesni_lrw_ctx {
> struct lrw_table_ctx lrw_table;
> u8 raw_aes_ctx[sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN - 1];
> @@ -282,10 +283,11 @@ static void (*aesni_gcm_dec_tfm)(void *ctx, u8 *out,
> static inline struct
> aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
> {
> - return
> - (struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
> - PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)
> - crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), AESNI_ALIGN);
> + unsigned long align = AESNI_ALIGN;
> +
> + if (align <= crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment())
> + align = 1;
> + return PTR_ALIGN(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), align);
> }
> #endif
>
> @@ -838,8 +840,6 @@ rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *key,
> unsigned int key_len) if (IS_ERR(ctr_tfm))
> return PTR_ERR(ctr_tfm);
>
> - crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(ctr_tfm, ~0);
> -
> ret = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(ctr_tfm, key, key_len);
> if (ret)
> goto out_free_ablkcipher;
> @@ -888,56 +888,20 @@ out_free_ablkcipher:
> static int common_rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
> unsigned int key_len)
> {
> - int ret = 0;
> - struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
> struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(aead);
> - u8 *new_key_align, *new_key_mem = NULL;
>
> if (key_len < 4) {
> - crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
> + crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> /*Account for 4 byte nonce at the end.*/
> key_len -= 4;
> - if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
> - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
> - crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
>
> memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + key_len, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
> - /*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/
> - if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_enc[0])) %
AESNI_ALIGN)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - if ((unsigned long)key % AESNI_ALIGN) {
> - /*key is not aligned: use an auxuliar aligned pointer*/
> - new_key_mem = kmalloc(key_len+AESNI_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!new_key_mem)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> - new_key_align = PTR_ALIGN(new_key_mem, AESNI_ALIGN);
> - memcpy(new_key_align, key, key_len);
> - key = new_key_align;
> - }
>
> - if (!irq_fpu_usable())
> - ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded),
> - key, key_len);
> - else {
> - kernel_fpu_begin();
> - ret = aesni_set_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded), key, key_len);
> - kernel_fpu_end();
> - }
> - /*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/
> - if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->hash_subkey[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN) {
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto exit;
> - }
> - ret = rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len);
> -exit:
> - kfree(new_key_mem);
> - return ret;
> + return aes_set_key_common(crypto_aead_tfm(aead),
> + &ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?:
> + rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len);
> }
>
> static int rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key,
> @@ -960,7 +924,7 @@ static int common_rfc4106_set_authsize(struct
> crypto_aead *aead, default:
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> - crypto_aead_crt(aead)->authsize = authsize;
> +
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -975,20 +939,17 @@ static int rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead
> *parent, return crypto_aead_setauthsize(&cryptd_tfm->base, authsize);
> }
>
> -static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
> +static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
> {
> u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
> u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
> __be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
> - u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length;
> void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
> unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
> - u8 iv_tab[16+AESNI_ALIGN];
> - u8* iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_tab, AESNI_ALIGN);
> + u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
> struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
> - struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
> struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
> unsigned int i;
>
> @@ -997,12 +958,6 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request
> *req) /* to 8 or 12 bytes */
> if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))
> return -EINVAL;
> - if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len
!=
> 16)) - return -EINVAL;
> - if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
> - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
> - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256))
> - return -EINVAL;
>
> /* IV below built */
> for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
> @@ -1011,55 +966,55 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct
> aead_request *req) *(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
> *((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
>
> - if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
> + if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
> + req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
> + sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
> + req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
> one_entry_in_sg = 1;
> scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
> - scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
> - src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> - assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
> + assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> + src = assoc + req->assoclen;
> dst = src;
> if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
> scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
> - dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
> + dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
> }
> -
> } else {
> /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
> - src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
> + assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
> GFP_ATOMIC);
> - if (unlikely(!src))
> + if (unlikely(!assoc))
> return -ENOMEM;
> - assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len);
> - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
> - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
> - req->assoclen, 0);
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
> + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
> + src = assoc + req->assoclen;
> dst = src;
> }
>
> + kernel_fpu_begin();
> aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, (unsigned long)req->cryptlen, iv,
> ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen, dst
> + ((unsigned long)req->cryptlen), auth_tag_len);
> + kernel_fpu_end();
>
> /* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
> * back to the packet. */
> if (one_entry_in_sg) {
> if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
> - scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
> - scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
> + scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
> + scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
> }
> - scatterwalk_unmap(src);
> scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
> - scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
> - scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
> + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
> } else {
> - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0,
> - req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
> - kfree(src);
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
> + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
> + kfree(assoc);
> }
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
> +static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
> {
> u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
> u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
> @@ -1068,26 +1023,16 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct
> aead_request *req) int retval = 0;
> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
> - u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length;
> void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
> unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
> - u8 iv_and_authTag[32+AESNI_ALIGN];
> - u8 *iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_and_authTag, AESNI_ALIGN);
> - u8 *authTag = iv + 16;
> + u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
> + u8 authTag[16];
> struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
> - struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
> struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
> unsigned int i;
>
> - if (unlikely((req->cryptlen < auth_tag_len) ||
> - (req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12)))
> + if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))
> return -EINVAL;
> - if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len
!=
> 16)) - return -EINVAL;
> - if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
> - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
> - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256))
> - return -EINVAL;
>
> /* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
> /* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */
> @@ -1101,33 +1046,36 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct
> aead_request *req) *(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
> *((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
>
> - if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
> + if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
> + req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
> + sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
> + req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
> one_entry_in_sg = 1;
> scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
> - scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
> - src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> - assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
> + assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
> + src = assoc + req->assoclen;
> dst = src;
> if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
> scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
> - dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
> + dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
> }
>
> } else {
> /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
> - src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
> - if (!src)
> + assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (!assoc)
> return -ENOMEM;
> - assoc = (src + req->cryptlen);
> - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
> - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
> - req->assoclen, 0);
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
> + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
> + src = assoc + req->assoclen;
> dst = src;
> }
>
> + kernel_fpu_begin();
> aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
> ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen,
> authTag, auth_tag_len);
> + kernel_fpu_end();
>
> /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
> retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
> @@ -1135,16 +1083,15 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct
> aead_request *req)
>
> if (one_entry_in_sg) {
> if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
> - scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
> - scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
> + scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
> + scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
The bug mentioned for patch 8 happens exactly at this spot.
> }
> - scatterwalk_unmap(src);
> scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
> - scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
> - scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
> + scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
> } else {
> - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, tempCipherLen, 1);
> - kfree(src);
> + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
> + tempCipherLen, 1);
> + kfree(assoc);
> }
> return retval;
> }
> @@ -1188,36 +1135,6 @@ static int rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
>
> return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
> }
> -
> -static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
> -{
> - int ret;
> -
> - if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) {
> - WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context");
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - } else {
> - kernel_fpu_begin();
> - ret = __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(req);
> - kernel_fpu_end();
> - }
> - return ret;
> -}
> -
> -static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
> -{
> - int ret;
> -
> - if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) {
> - WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context");
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - } else {
> - kernel_fpu_begin();
> - ret = __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(req);
> - kernel_fpu_end();
> - }
> - return ret;
> -}
> #endif
>
> static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
> @@ -1389,27 +1306,6 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
> .geniv = "chainiv",
> },
> },
> -}, {
> - .cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni",
> - .cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni",
> - .cra_priority = 0,
> - .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
> - .cra_blocksize = 1,
> - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx) +
> - AESNI_ALIGN,
> - .cra_alignmask = 0,
> - .cra_type = &crypto_aead_type,
> - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
> - .cra_u = {
> - .aead = {
> - .setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key,
> - .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize,
> - .encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt,
> - .decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt,
> - .ivsize = 8,
> - .maxauthsize = 16,
> - },
> - },
> #endif
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC)
> }, {
> @@ -1526,6 +1422,22 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] = { {
> + .setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key,
> + .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize,
> + .encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt,
> + .decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt,
> + .ivsize = 8,
> + .maxauthsize = 16,
> + .base = {
> + .cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni",
> + .cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni",
> + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
> + .cra_blocksize = 1,
> + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct
aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx),
> + .cra_alignmask = AESNI_ALIGN - 1,
> + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
> + },
> +}, {
> .init = rfc4106_init,
> .exit = rfc4106_exit,
> .setkey = rfc4106_set_key,
> --
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--
Ciao
Stephan
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