On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: > Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that > we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks > for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module > signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto > subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and > mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. > > v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline > function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. > > CC: Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au> > CC: "David S. Miller" <da...@davemloft.net> > CC: Rusty Russell <ru...@rustcorp.com.au> > CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.muel...@atsec.com> > CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <ja...@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhor...@tuxdriver.com>
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