Hi Herbert, > I know why you want to do this, what I'm asking is do you have any > research behind this with regards to security > > Has this scheme been discussed on a public forum somewhere?
No, sorry, I haven't found much valuable discussion about TFC padding. Nothing at all how to overcome the ESPv2 padding limit. > using an insecure RNG to generate a value that is then used as the > basis for concealment Using get_random_bytes() adds another ~10% processing overhead due to the underlying sha_transform. But this is probably negligible, we add much more with the additional padding to encrypt/MAC. I'll re-spin the patchset with get_random_bytes(). Even if the ESPv2 padding fallback makes TFC in this case less efficient, it shouldn't harm. Or do you see this differently? Regards Martin -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
