On Sun, Feb 15, 2009 at 05:00:52PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
>
> But kmem_cache_size() would tell you how much extra secret memory there
> is available after the object?
> 
> How that gets along with redzoning is a bit of a mystery though.
> 
> The whole concept is quite hacky and nasty, isn't it?.  Does
> networking/crypto actually show any gain from pulling this stunt?

I see no point in calling ksize on memory that's not kmalloced.
So no there is nothing to be gained from having kmem_cache_ksize.

However, for kmalloced memory we're wasting hundreds of bytes
for the standard 1500 byte allocation without ksize which means
that we're doing reallocations (and sometimes copying) when it
isn't necessary.

Cheers,
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