On Sun, Feb 15, 2009 at 05:00:52PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote: > > But kmem_cache_size() would tell you how much extra secret memory there > is available after the object? > > How that gets along with redzoning is a bit of a mystery though. > > The whole concept is quite hacky and nasty, isn't it?. Does > networking/crypto actually show any gain from pulling this stunt?
I see no point in calling ksize on memory that's not kmalloced. So no there is nothing to be gained from having kmem_cache_ksize. However, for kmalloced memory we're wasting hundreds of bytes for the standard 1500 byte allocation without ksize which means that we're doing reallocations (and sometimes copying) when it isn't necessary. Cheers, -- Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/ Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
