On Thu, 2006-12-07 at 19:43 +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > On Thursday 07 December 2006 16:19, Jan Glauber wrote: > > Hm, why is /dev/urandom implemented in the kernel? > > > > It could be done completely in user-space (like libica already does) > > but I think having a device node where you can read from is the simplest > > implementation. Also, if we can solve the security flaw we could use it > > as replacement for /dev/urandom. > > urandom is more useful, because can't be implemented in user space at > all. /dev/urandom will use the real randomness from the kernel as a seed > without depleting the entropy pool. How does your /dev/prandom device > compare to /dev/urandom performance-wise? If it can be made to use > the same input data and it turns out to be significantly faster, I can > see some use for it.
The performance of the PRNG without constantly adding entropy is up tp factor 40 faster than /dev/urandom ;- , depending on the block size of the read. With the current patch it performs not so well because of the STCKE loop before every KMC. I think about removing them and changing the periodically seed to use get_random_bytes instead. Jan - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
