On 5/14/2021 12:23 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 01:07:56PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Create a new entry "interface_lsm" in the procfs attr directory for
>> controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a
>> process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
>>
>> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for
>> human readable data may be written to "interface_lsm" to set the
>> value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from
>> "interface_lsm". At this point there can only be one LSM capable
>> of display active. A helper function lsm_task_ilsm() is
>> provided to get the interface lsm slot for a task_struct.
>>
>> Setting the "interface_lsm" requires that all security modules using
>> setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is
>> responsible for defining its policy.
>>
>> AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <[email protected]>
>> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
>> Cc: John Johansen <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
>> Cc: [email protected]
>> Cc: [email protected]
>> ---
>> .../ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display | 22 +++
>> Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++
>> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 17 ++
>> security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 ++++
>> security/security.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++--
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++
>> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +
>> 10 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
>> b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..0f60005c235c
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/procfs-attr-lsm_display
>> @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
>> +What: /proc/*/attr/lsm_display
>> +Contact: [email protected],
>> +Description: The name of the Linux security module (LSM) that will
>> + provide information in the /proc/*/attr/current,
>> + /proc/*/attr/prev and /proc/*/attr/exec interfaces.
>> + The details of permissions required to read from
>> + this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
>> + system.
>> + A process cannot write to this interface unless it
>> + refers to itself.
>> + The other details of permissions required to write to
>> + this interface are dependent on the LSMs active on the
>> + system.
>> + The format of the data used by this interface is a
>> + text string identifying the name of an LSM. The values
>> + accepted are:
>> + selinux - the SELinux LSM
>> + smack - the Smack LSM
>> + apparmor - The AppArmor LSM
>> + By convention the LSM names are lower case and do not
>> + contain special characters.
>> +Users: LSM user-space
>> diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
>> index 6a2a2e973080..b77b4a540391 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
>> @@ -129,3 +129,17 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be
>> registered.
>> The capabilities security module does not use the general security
>> blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are
>> based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns.
>> +
>> +LSM External Interfaces
>> +=======================
>> +
>> +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
>> +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
>> +require.
>> +
>> +The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma
>> +separated list of the active security modules.
>> +
>> +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/interface_lsm`` contains the name of the security
>> +module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will
>> +apply. This interface can be written to.
>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>> index 3851bfcdba56..10de522f3112 100644
>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>> @@ -2807,6 +2807,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
>> ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666),
>> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666),
>> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666),
>> + ATTR(NULL, "interface_lsm", 0666),
> Anyone can open this file... (continued below)
>
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
>> DIR("smack", 0555,
>> proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index c61a16f0a5bc..d2c4bc94d47f 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -1686,4 +1686,21 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct
>> security_hook_list *hooks,
>>
>> extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
>>
>> +/**
>> + * lsm_task_ilsm - the "interface_lsm" for this task
>> + * @task: The task to report on
>> + *
>> + * Returns the task's interface LSM slot.
>> + */
>> +static inline int lsm_task_ilsm(struct task_struct *task)
>> +{
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>> + int *ilsm = task->security;
>> +
>> + if (ilsm)
>> + return *ilsm;
>> +#endif
>> + return LSMBLOB_INVALID;
>> +}
>> +
>> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
>> b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
>> index 1fbabdb565a8..b1622fcb4394 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
>> @@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
>> #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10
>> #define AA_CLASS_NET 14
>> #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16
>> +#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17
>>
>> -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL
>> +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM
>>
>> /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
>> extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> index 392e25940d1f..4237536106aa 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>> @@ -621,6 +621,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct
>> *task, char *name,
>> return error;
>> }
>>
>> +
>> +static int profile_interface_lsm(struct aa_profile *profile,
>> + struct common_audit_data *sa)
>> +{
>> + struct aa_perms perms = { };
>> + unsigned int state;
>> +
>> + state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM);
>> + if (state) {
>> + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
>> + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
>> + aad(sa)->label = &profile->label;
>> +
>> + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, AA_MAY_WRITE, sa, NULL);
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
>> size_t size)
>> {
>> @@ -632,6 +651,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void
>> *value,
>> if (size == 0)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> + /* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of interface_lsm if allowed */
>> + if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
>> + struct aa_profile *profile;
>> + struct aa_label *label;
>> +
>> + aad(&sa)->info = "set interface lsm";
>> + label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
>> + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
>> + profile_interface_lsm(profile, &sa));
>> + end_current_label_crit_section(label);
>> + return error;
>> + }
>> +
>> /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
>> if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
>> /* null terminate */
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index f5407a85641e..1ce125c01782 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -77,7 +77,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
>> static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>>
>> char *lsm_names;
>> -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * The task blob includes the "interface_lsm" slot used for
>> + * chosing which module presents contexts.
>> + * Using a long to avoid potential alignment issues with
>> + * module assigned task blobs.
>> + */
>> +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + .lbs_task = sizeof(long),
>> +};
>>
>> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>> static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
>> @@ -669,6 +678,8 @@ int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
>> */
>> static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>> {
>> + int *ilsm;
>> +
>> if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
>> task->security = NULL;
>> return 0;
>> @@ -677,6 +688,15 @@ static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>> task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
>> if (task->security == NULL)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * The start of the task blob contains the "interface" LSM slot number.
>> + * Start with it set to the invalid slot number, indicating that the
>> + * default first registered LSM be displayed.
>> + */
>> + ilsm = task->security;
>> + *ilsm = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
>> +
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -1732,14 +1752,26 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
>>
>> int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
>> {
>> + int *oilsm = current->security;
>> + int *nilsm;
>> int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
>>
>> - if (rc)
>> + if (unlikely(rc))
>> return rc;
>> +
>> rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
>> - if (unlikely(rc))
>> + if (unlikely(rc)) {
>> security_task_free(task);
>> - return rc;
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (oilsm) {
>> + nilsm = task->security;
>> + if (nilsm)
>> + *nilsm = *oilsm;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> }
>>
>> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>> @@ -2171,23 +2203,110 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
>> const char *lsm, char *name,
>> char **value)
>> {
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
>> + int slot = 0;
>> +
>> + if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
>> + /*
>> + * lsm_slot will be 0 if there are no displaying modules.
>> + */
>> + if (lsm_slot == 0)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Only allow getting the current process' interface_lsm.
>> + * There are too few reasons to get another process'
>> + * interface_lsm and too many LSM policy issues.
>> + */
>> + if (current != p)
>> + return -EINVAL;
> ... but context isn't established by just checking "current", as this
> file handle may have been given to another process.
>
> I suspect the security_get/setprocattr needs to gain a pointer to "file"
> so that the f_cred struct can be examined[1] (i.e. compare opener
> against reader/writer).
>
> [1]
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html#open-file-credentials
It's not credentials being checked here. The check is whether the task that
would be affected is "current". Process A can't open /proc/B/attr/interface_lsm
with write access. The only process that can open it for write access is B.
If process B opens /proc/B/attr/interface_lsm for write access it could send
the file handle to process A, but process A can't write to the file because
(current != p) that is, (A != B).
>> +
>> + ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(p);
>> + if (ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID)
>> + slot = ilsm;
>> + *value = kstrdup(lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (*value)
>> + return strlen(*value);
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + }
>>
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
>> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>> continue;
>> + if (lsm == NULL && ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
>> + ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
>> + continue;
>> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
>> }
>> return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
>> }
>>
>> +/**
>> + * security_setprocattr - Set process attributes via /proc
>> + * @lsm: name of module involved, or NULL
>> + * @name: name of the attribute
>> + * @value: value to set the attribute to
>> + * @size: size of the value
>> + *
>> + * Set the process attribute for the specified security module
>> + * to the specified value. Note that this can only be used to set
>> + * the process attributes for the current, or "self" process.
>> + * The /proc code has already done this check.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success, an appropriate code otherwise.
>> + */
>> int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
>> size_t size)
>> {
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + char *termed;
>> + char *copy;
>> + int *ilsm = current->security;
>> + int rc = -EINVAL;
>> + int slot = 0;
>> +
>> + if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm")) {
>> + /*
>> + * Change the "interface_lsm" value only if all the security
>> + * modules that support setting a procattr allow it.
>> + * It is assumed that all such security modules will be
>> + * cooperative.
>> + */
>> + if (size == 0)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr,
>> + list) {
>> + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>> + if (rc < 0)
>> + return rc;
>> + }
> Similarly here -- how do the LSMs reason about who actually _opened_
> this file?
>
> -Kees
>
>> +
>> + rc = -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + copy = kmemdup_nul(value, size, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (copy == NULL)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + termed = strsep(©, " \n");
>> +
>> + for (slot = 0; slot < lsm_slot; slot++)
>> + if (!strcmp(termed, lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm)) {
>> + *ilsm = lsm_slotlist[slot]->slot;
>> + rc = size;
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + kfree(termed);
>> + return rc;
>> + }
>>
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
>> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
>> continue;
>> + if (lsm == NULL && *ilsm != LSMBLOB_INVALID &&
>> + *ilsm != hp->lsmid->slot)
>> + continue;
>> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
>> }
>> return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
>> @@ -2207,15 +2326,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>> int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32
>> *seclen)
>> {
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> - int rc;
>> + int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
>>
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
>> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> continue;
>> - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
>> - secdata, seclen);
>> - if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
>> - return rc;
>> + if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
>> + return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(
>> + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
>> + secdata, seclen);
>> }
>>
>> return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
>> @@ -2226,16 +2345,15 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
>> u32 seclen,
>> struct lsmblob *blob)
>> {
>> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> - int rc;
>> + int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
>>
>> lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
>> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
>> if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
>> continue;
>> - rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
>> - &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> - if (rc != 0)
>> - return rc;
>> + if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
>> + return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
>> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
>> }
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -2243,7 +2361,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>>
>> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>> {
>> - call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> + int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list)
>> + if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot) {
>> + hp->hook.release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
>>
>> @@ -2384,8 +2509,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
>> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user
>> *optval,
>> int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
>> {
>> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
>> - optval, optlen, len);
>> + int ilsm = lsm_task_ilsm(current);
>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +
>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream,
>> + list)
>> + if (ilsm == LSMBLOB_INVALID || ilsm == hp->lsmid->slot)
>> + return hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
>> + optlen, len);
>> + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
>> }
>>
>> int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff
>> *skb,
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 0133b142e938..dba867721336 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -6510,6 +6510,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void
>> *value, size_t size)
>> /*
>> * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
>> */
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * For setting interface_lsm, we only perform a permission check;
>> + * the actual update to the interface_lsm value is handled by the
>> + * LSM framework.
>> + */
>> + if (!strcmp(name, "interface_lsm"))
>> + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
>> + mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2,
>> + PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY, NULL);
>> +
>> if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
>> error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
>> mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> index 62d19bccf3de..8f4b0dd6dd78 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
>> @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
>> "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
>> "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
>> { "process2",
>> - { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
>> + { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } },
>> { "system",
>> { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
>> "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index 5c10ad27be37..7aa7ea38f627 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -3508,6 +3508,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void
>> *value, size_t size)
>> struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
>> int rc;
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "interface_lsm"
>> + * to be reset at will.
>> + */
>> + if (strcmp(name, "interface_lsm") == 0)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
>> return -EPERM;
>>
>> --
>> 2.29.2
>>
--
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