[ If you're not familiar with the GSSAPI key exchange patches, or unsure why 
they make OpenSSH usable in large Kerberos deployments, 
http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html contains some background 
information ]

Regular readers of these emails will be aware that they've recently all begun 
with apologies for the delay in producing the patch - this has been down to a 
poor tool chain, and $work using systems which no longer have a need for these 
patches to work with the latest and greatest OpenSSH binary.

So, the major announcement here is that I've made significant changes to the 
way in which these patches are produced. This should hopefully both make it 
easier (and quicker) for me to produce them in future, and make it simpler for 
others who want to produce patches based upon them.

Firstly, I've created a git-cvsimport mirror of the OpenSSH portable repository 
at https://github.com/SimonWilkinson/openssh/ 

This is a regularly updated git repository which purely tracks the code 
available from anoncvs.mindrot.org.

Secondly, the GSSAPI OpenSSH key exchange patches are now based on a clone of 
this git tree. This makes it much easier to track the patches, and to merge 
them into forthcoming releases. The tree with the patches in is available from
https://github.com/SimonWilkinson/gss-openssh/ 

A patch for each release will continue to be available from my website at 
http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html

As well as updating the patch to OpenSSH 5.6p1, the new release also adds 
support for a GSSAPIServerIdentity client configuration directive. This allows 
the user to give the GSSAPI acceptor identity (Kerberos principal) which the 
server will use to accept their request. It is useful in situations such as 
port forwarding, where the name that must be used to reach a particular host 
doesn't match the name that that machine knows itself by. Thanks to Jim Basney 
for this code!

Cheers,

Simon.


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