Matt Zagrabelny <[email protected]> writes:
> Thanks again, Russ. Still not getting logged in to the switch, but
> things are looking closer. I don't have console access to the switch
> right now, so I do not see the current error, but the logs from the KDC
> look better:
> Mar 30 19:48:07 stout krb5kdc[27785](info): AS_REQ (1 etypes {1})
> 10.25.1.14: ISSUE: authtime 1269996487, etypes {rep=1 tkt=18 ses=1},
> [email protected] for krbtgt/[email protected]
> Is it normal to have such drastic different types of encryption for the
> various parts?
> rep=1
> tkt=18
> ses=1
Yes, nothing should care about the ticket enctype except the KDC.
> I mean, the switch cannot handle aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 (etype 18).
> Does that matter?
It shouldn't. It would only if the switch's implementation of Kerberos is
completely broken. (Although that's happened before in very old versions
of Java, IIRC.)
--
Russ Allbery ([email protected]) <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>
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