https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=379294
--- Comment #7 from Martin Sandsmark <martin.sandsm...@kde.org> --- again, I was just coming up with hypothetical scenarios based on the use cases of the proposed feature (having "magic" links in mutt seems kind of reasonable, as does clickable files starting applications to view them). neomutt is probably a better hypothetical target, they're a bit less conservative in what kind of features they implement. and I'm fairly certain konsole never implemented the escape sequences for injecting keystrokes in the first place either (and was not susceptible to the window title escape sequence trick either). about the clickable filenames it's a bit off topic for this bug, but you need to turn in on in the settings. and how konsole tracks the current directory depends on OS and shell (if it supports OCS7), but that feature is much older, but earlier it was just used to display the current directory in the window/tab title. > And you can't just blindly assume that 3-4 other components all have security > issues I think that's where you and I disagree. you could make the same argument against sandboxing and many other defense in depth strategies. but misunderstand me correctly; I'm not violently opposed to this, I just don't believe the security/usefulness tradeoff is good here. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are watching all bug changes.
