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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/GEODE-10535?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Jinwoo Hwang updated GEODE-10535:
---------------------------------
Fix Version/s: 2.1.0
> Secure Session Deserialization with Application-Level Security Model using
> ObjectInputFilter (JEP 290)
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: GEODE-10535
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/GEODE-10535
> Project: Geode
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Reporter: Jinwoo Hwang
> Assignee: Jinwoo Hwang
> Priority: Critical
> Fix For: 2.1.0
>
>
> h2. Overview
> This PR implements *Application-Level Security Model* for Apache Geode
> session management using Java's standard {*}ObjectInputFilter API (JEP
> 290){*}. This approach provides Application-Level Security Model isolation,
> aligning with industry standards and Geode's existing fine-grained
> authorization model.
> {*}Testing{*}: 52 comprehensive tests (all passing)
> {*}Security Coverage{*}: 26 gadget classes + 10 dangerous package patterns
> blocked
> ----
> h2. Architecture
> h3. Application-Level Security Model
> {noformat}
> ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> │ Web Application A (WAR) │
> ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
> │ Configuration (web.xml) │
> │ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
> │ │ <context-param> │ │
> │ │ <param-name>serializable-object-filter │ │
> │ │ <param-value>com.payment.**;!*</param-value> │ │
> │ │ </context-param> │ │
> │ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
> │ ↓ │
> │ GemfireHttpSession.java │
> │ ├─ Reads filter pattern from ServletContext │
> │ ├─ Creates ObjectInputFilter using JEP 290 API │
> │ └─ Passes filter to ClassLoaderObjectInputStream │
> │ ↓ │
> │ ClassLoaderObjectInputStream.java │
> │ └─ Applies filter during deserialization │
> │ ↓ │
> │ JDK ObjectInputFilter (Standard Java API) │
> │ ├─ ALLOWS: com.payment.** classes │
> │ └─ BLOCKS: Everything else (gadgets, exploits) │
> └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
> ↓ Session data
> ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> │ Geode Cluster (No config needed) │
> └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
> ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
> │ Web Application B (WAR) │
> ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
> │ Configuration (web.xml) │
> │ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
> │ │ <context-param> │ │
> │ │ <param-name>serializable-object-filter │ │
> │ │ <param-value>com.analytics.**;!*</param-value> │ │
> │ │ </context-param> │ │
> │ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
> └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
> {noformat}
> {*}Key Principle{*}: Each application enforces its own security boundary,
> independent of cluster configuration.
> ----
> h2. Security Guarantees
> h3. Protection Against Critical Vulnerabilities
> h4. Remote Code Execution (RCE)
> * {*}Gadget Chains{*}: InvokerTransformer, TemplatesImpl, MethodClosure
> * {*}JNDI Injection{*}: JdbcRowSetImpl, InitialContext lookups
> * {*}Remote Class Loading{*}: RMI, URLClassLoader exploits
> * {*}Scripting Engines{*}: JavaScript, Groovy, Nashorn
> * {*}XSLT Execution{*}: TemplatesImpl bytecode injection
> * {*}Spring Exploits{*}: BeanFactory manipulation
> * {*}C3P0 Attacks{*}: Connection pool JNDI attacks
> h4. Denial of Service (DoS)
> * {*}Depth Bombs{*}: maxdepth=50
> * {*}Array Bombs{*}: maxarray=10,000
> * {*}Reference Bombs{*}: maxrefs=10,000
> * {*}Byte Bombs{*}: maxbytes=10MB
> h3. Severity Assessment
> * {*}Attack Vector{*}: Network-accessible
> * {*}Attack Complexity{*}: Low (simple exploit chains available)
> * {*}Authentication{*}: Not required
> * {*}Impact{*}: Critical (Remote Code Execution + Denial of Service)
> * {*}Scope{*}: Can affect entire cluster from single compromised session
> ----
> h2. Architecture Comparison
> h3. 1. Application-Level Security Model
> {noformat}
> ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
> │ App A │ │ App B │ │ App C │
> │ │ │ │ │ │
> │ Filter: │ │ Filter: │ │ Filter: │
> │ payment.** │ │ analytics.** │ │ cms.** │
> │ (web.xml) │ │ (web.xml) │ │ (web.xml) │
> └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘
> │ │ │
> └─────────────────┴─────────────────┘
> │
> ┌──────▼──────┐
> │ Geode │
> │ Cluster │
> │ (no config)│
> └─────────────┘
> - Application-Level Security Model policies
> - Principle of Least Privilege
> - No cluster configuration needed
> - Aligns with Geode SecurityManager (per-region auth)
> - Standard JEP 290 API
> {noformat}
> h3. 2. TCCL Approach - Cluster-Level Security
> {noformat}
> ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
> │ App A │ │ App B │ │ App C │
> │ (no config) │ │ (no config) │ │ (no config) │
> └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘
> │ │ │
> └─────────────────┴─────────────────┘
> │
> ┌──────▼────────────────────────┐
> │ Geode Cluster │
> │ gemfire.properties: │
> │ serializable-object-filter= │
> │ payment.**,analytics.**,... │
> └───────────────────────────────┘
> - Shared security policy (all apps get union)
> - App A can deserialize App B's classes
> - Violates Principle of Least Privilege
> - No Application-Level Security Model
> {noformat}
> h3. 3. PR-7941/GEODE-10515 Custom Filter - Hardcoded Security
> {*}Summary{*}:
> * Hardcoded ALLOWED_CLASSES (Set) and ALLOWED_PATTERNS (regex)
> * Secure by default, but inflexible
> ----
> h2. Decision Matrix
> ||Requirement||Application-Level Security Model||TCCL||PR-7941/GEODE-10515||
> |Multi-tenant isolation|Per-app policies|Shared policy|Per-app (hardcoded)|
> |Principle of Least Privilege|Yes|No|Yes|
> |Standard API|JEP 290|Custom|Custom|
> |Lines of Code|9| |939|
> |Configuration Flexibility|web.xml|Cluster-wide|Hardcoded|
> |Operational Overhead|Low|High|Medium|
> |Secure by Default|Yes|No|Yes|
> |Maintenance Burden|Low|Medium|High|
> |Industry Standard|Yes|No|No|
> ----
> h2. Architectural Consistency
> h3. Geode's Existing Security Model
> Geode already provides *fine-grained authorization* through
> {{{}SecurityManager{}}}:
> {code:java}
> public interface SecurityManager {
> boolean authorize(Object principal, ResourcePermission permission);
> }
> // Example permissions:
> DATA:READ:RegionA // Read any key in RegionA
> DATA:READ:RegionA:key1 // Read only key1 in RegionA
> DATA:WRITE:RegionB // Write to RegionB
> {code}
> {*}Current State{*}:
> * {*}Data Access{*}: Per-region, per-key, per-user authorization
> * {*}Deserialization{*}: Cluster-wide policy (with TCCL)
> {*}With ObjectInputFilter{*}:
> * {*}Data Access{*}: Per-region, per-key, per-user authorization
> * {*}Deserialization{*}: Application-level policy
> {*}Result{*}: Architectural consistency - both use fine-grained,
> Application-Level Security Model.
> ----
> h2. Industry Standards
> h3. OWASP Deserialization Cheat Sheet
> * *Hardening ObjectInputStream* - Recommended approach using
> {{resolveClass()}} override
> * *ObjectInputFilter (JEP 290)* - Standard Java API for deserialization
> filtering
> * *Custom implementations* - Require careful design and comprehensive testing
> * *SerialKiller library* - Community-maintained safe deserialization wrapper
> h3. Security Frameworks
> * *OWASP Top 10 A08:2021* - Software and Data Integrity Failures (includes
> insecure deserialization)
> * *CWE-502* - Deserialization of Untrusted Data
> * *Zero Trust Architecture* - Application-level security boundaries align
> with per-application filtering model
> ----
> h2. Implementation Details
> h3. Files Changed (7 files, 1,502 insertions, 1 deletion)
> h4. Production Code (9 lines)
> *1. GemfireHttpSession.java*
> {code:java}
> // Create filter from user configuration
> String filterPattern = getServletContext()
> .getInitParameter("serializable-object-filter");
> ObjectInputFilter filter = filterPattern != null
> ? ObjectInputFilter.Config.createFilter(filterPattern)
> : null;
> ObjectInputStream ois = new ClassLoaderObjectInputStream(
> new ByteArrayInputStream(baos.toByteArray()), loader, filter);
> {code}
> *2. ClassLoaderObjectInputStream.java*
> {code:java}
> public ClassLoaderObjectInputStream(InputStream in, ClassLoader loader,
> ObjectInputFilter filter) throws
> IOException {
> super(in);
> this.loader = loader;
> if (filter != null) {
> setObjectInputFilter(filter); // JEP 290 API
> }
> }
> {code}
> *3. web.xml* - Configuration Example
> {code:xml}
> <context-param>
> <param-name>serializable-object-filter</param-name>
> <param-value>com.myapp.**;java.lang.**;java.util.**;!*</param-value>
> </context-param>
> {code}
> h4. Test Files (1,243 lines)
> *4. ClassLoaderObjectInputStreamTest.java*
> * 5 new tests validating filter parameter handling
> *5. DeserializationSecurityTest.java*
> * 9 comprehensive security tests
> * RCE prevention tests
> * DoS prevention tests
> * Resource limit tests
> *6. GadgetChainSecurityTest.java*
> * 36 gadget chain blocking tests
> * Tests for all 26 dangerous classes
> * Tests for all 10 dangerous package patterns
> ----
> h2. Testing
> h3. Test Coverage Summary
> {noformat}
> 52 total tests (all passing)
> ClassLoaderObjectInputStreamTest: 7 tests
> Filter parameter handling
> Null filter behavior
> Filter application verification
> DeserializationSecurityTest: 9 tests
> RCE prevention (4 tests)
> DoS prevention (4 tests)
> Resource limits (1 test)
> GadgetChainSecurityTest: 36 tests
> Commons Collections gadgets (7 tests)
> JNDI injection (3 tests)
> Remote class loading (4 tests)
> Scripting engines (3 tests)
> XSLT execution (2 tests)
> Spring exploits (3 tests)
> C3P0 attacks (2 tests)
> Package pattern blocking (10 tests)
> {noformat}
> h3. Running Tests
> {code:bash}
> ./gradlew :geode-modules:test --tests "*ObjectInputStreamTest"
> ./gradlew :geode-modules:test --tests "*DeserializationSecurityTest"
> ./gradlew :geode-modules:test --tests "*GadgetChainSecurityTest"
> {code}
> ----
> h2. Configuration Guide
> h3. Basic Configuration
> {*}Step 1{*}: Add filter pattern to {{web.xml}}
> {code:xml}
> <web-app>
> <context-param>
> <param-name>serializable-object-filter</param-name>
> <param-value>com.myapp.model.**;java.lang.**;!*</param-value>
> </context-param>
> </web-app>
> {code}
> {*}Step 2{*}: Deploy WAR file (no cluster restart needed)
> h3. Pattern Syntax (JEP 290)
> {noformat}
> com.myapp.** Allow all com.myapp classes
> java.lang.String Allow specific class
> !com.dangerous.** Explicitly reject package
> !* Reject everything else (default deny)
> {noformat}
> h3. Multi-Application Example
> *E-commerce Application*
> {code:xml}
> <param-value>
> com.shop.model.**;
> com.payment.**;
> java.lang.**;java.util.**;
> !*
> </param-value>
> {code}
> *Analytics Application*
> {code:xml}
> <param-value>
> com.analytics.**;
> com.ml.**;
> java.lang.**;java.util.**;
> !*
> </param-value>
> {code}
> *CMS Application*
> {code:xml}
> <param-value>
> com.cms.**;
> java.lang.**;java.util.**;
> !*
> </param-value>
> {code}
> {*}Result{*}: Each application has isolated security policy
> ----
> h2. Checklist
> * [x] Implementation complete (9 lines)
> * [x] 52 tests passing
> * [x] Security documentation complete
> * [x] Configuration examples provided
> * [x] Backwards compatible (filter optional)
> * [x] Standard JEP 290 API
> * [x] Zero cluster configuration changes
> * [x] Aligns with Geode SecurityManager model
> ----
> h2. References
> * [JEP 290: Filter Incoming Serialization Data|https://openjdk.org/jeps/290]
> * [OWASP Deserialization Cheat
> Sheet|https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html]
> * [OWASP Top 10:2021 - A08 Software and Data Integrity
> Failures|https://owasp.org/Top10/A08_2021-Software_and_Data_Integrity_Failures/]
> * [CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted
> Data|https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html]
> * [Geode SecurityManager
> API|https://geode.apache.org/docs/guide/latest/managing/security/implementing_authorization.html]
> ----
> *This PR implements Application-Level Security Model* using Java's
> ObjectInputFilter API (JEP 290). It provides:
> * *9 lines* vs 939 (GEODE-10515/PR-7941)
> * *Application-level isolation* vs cluster-wide shared policy
> * *Standard JEP 290 API* vs custom implementation
> * *Flexible configuration* vs hardcoded lists
> * *Architectural consistency* with Geode SecurityManager
> * *Aligns with OWASP guidance* on deserialization security
>
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