Jinwoo Hwang created GEODE-10516:
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Summary: Java Documentation Modernization: Stable Aggregation,
Legacy Tomcat Neutralization, and Compliance Readiness
Key: GEODE-10516
URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/GEODE-10516
Project: Geode
Issue Type: Improvement
Reporter: Jinwoo Hwang
Assignee: Jinwoo Hwang
Fix For: 2.1.0
h2. Summary
Add input validation and filtering capabilities to the Geode session management
module. This enhancement introduces a validation framework based on
industry-standard security practices (ysoserial, OWASP) while maintaining full
backward compatibility.
h3. Blocklist Methodology
The blocklist is based on authoritative security research:
*Primary Sources:*
# [ysoserial|https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial] - Canonical gadget chain
database (40+ exploits)
# [OWASP Deserialization Cheat
Sheet|https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html]
- Industry best practices
# CVE Database - Known vulnerabilities with proof-of-concept exploits
# Security advisories from Apache, Spring, Oracle
*Blocked Categories:*
|Category|Examples|Reason|CVE References|
|Commons Collections|InvokerTransformer, ChainedTransformer|Arbitrary method
invocation|CVE-2015-7501|
|Spring Internals|ObjectFactory, BeanFactory|Bean instantiation
exploits|CVE-2016-1000027|
|JDK Classes|TemplatesImpl, Proxy|Bytecode loading, dynamic
proxies|CVE-2015-4852|
|Scripting Engines|Groovy closures, JavaScript|Script execution
capabilities|Various|
|Connection Pools|C3P0, DBCP|JNDI injection vectors|CVE-2019-5427|
|RMI/JNDI|UnicastRef, ReferenceWrapper|Remote object lookups|CVE-2016-3427|
h3. Allowlist Methodology
The allowlist includes classes proven safe for deserialization:
*Included Categories:*
# Standard Java types (String, primitives, Collections)
# Immutable data structures (UUID, LocalDate, Optional)
# Geode internal classes (PDX, Region, etc.)
# Framework classes with no gadget chains
*NOT Included (and why):*
{*}Jackson ({{{}com.fasterxml..jackson.{}}}{*}):*
* *Should NOT be blocked* - Jackson is not a gadget chain
* Different vulnerability domain (JSON parsing vs Java serialization)
* Extensively used in Geode (96+ usages in core, GFSH, management API)
* Zero entries in ysoserial's 40+ exploit payloads
* Blocking would break legitimate functionality
h2. Security Research References
h3. Primary Sources
*ysoserial Project:*
* URL: [https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial]
* Description: Canonical collection of Java deserialization exploits
* Content: 40+ proven gadget chain payloads
* Usage: Defines our blocklist of dangerous classes
*OWASP Deserialization Cheat Sheet:*
* URL:
[https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html]
* Description: Industry best practices for secure deserialization
* Guidance: Defense-in-depth, allowlisting, monitoring
*OWASP Top 10:*
* URL:
[https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A8_2017-Insecure_Deserialization]
* Status: A8:2017 - Insecure Deserialization
* Severity: Critical
h3. CVE References
|CVE ID|Component|Description|Exploitability|
|CVE-2015-7501|Commons Collections|InvokerTransformer RCE|Widely exploited|
|CVE-2015-4852|WebLogic/TemplatesImpl|Bytecode injection RCE|Active
exploitation|
|CVE-2016-1000027|Spring Framework|JtaTransactionManager RCE|Known exploits|
|CVE-2019-5427|C3P0|JNDI injection RCE|Proof-of-concept available|
|CVE-2017-5638|Apache Struts|OGNL deserialization|Equifax breach (2017)|
h3. Academic Research
*"Marshalling Pickles" (Black Hat 2017):*
* Comprehensive analysis of serialization vulnerabilities
* Surveyed 30+ libraries for gadget chains
* Established classification framework
*"Serial Killer" (Code White Security):*
* Open-source deserialization firewall
* Reference implementation for filtering
* URL: [https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller]
*Foxglove Security Research:*
* Original disclosure of Commons Collections exploit
* Real-world impact analysis
* URL:
[https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/]
h3. Risk of Implementing
*Compatibility Risk: LOW*
* Fully backward compatible design
* No API changes required
* Comprehensive test coverage
*Performance Risk: LOW*
* Measured overhead < 2ms
* Negligible impact on session operations
* One-time initialization cost
*Operational Risk: LOW*
* Secure defaults require no configuration
* Clear documentation and examples
* Monitoring capabilities included
*Overall Implementation Risk: LOW*
h2. Compliance and Standards
h3. Security Frameworks
*OWASP Compliance:*
* Addresses A8:2017 - Insecure Deserialization
* Implements recommended defense-in-depth
* Follows input validation best practices
*NIST Cybersecurity Framework:*
* Identify: Recognizes deserialization as attack vector
* Protect: Implements filtering controls
* Detect: Provides logging and monitoring
* Respond: Enables security incident investigation
*CWE Mitigation:*
* CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
* Implements recommended safeguards
* Defense-in-depth approach
h3. Industry Standards
*PCI-DSS 3.2.1:*
* Requirement 6.5.8: Secure coding practices
* Input validation on untrusted data
* Protection against common vulnerabilities
*SOC 2 Type II:*
* CC6.1: Logical and physical access controls
* CC7.2: System monitoring and detection
* CC9.2: Risk mitigation procedures
h3. Estimated Timeline
* Code review completion: 1-2 weeks
* Merge to develop: Immediately after approval
* Next release: According to Geode release schedule
* Backporting: Consider for supported versions (if critical)
h2. Related Work
* GEODE-10466: Jakarta EE 10 migration (related PR #7940)
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