Bob, Thank you for your reply. I took some time to review the points. Look for EVY2> below but at first sight, this looks really good to me now. Of course, Roman and Ben will have a final say.
About Ekr’s comment, I am reading your latest email sent minutes ago, and I am still unclear where, in the text, it is shown that FS is not achievable. Action plan: please apply the changes you have proposed below, post a revised I-D, then on my side: * Launching an IETF Last Call for 2 weeks (as written below some important changes have been made but I expect the LC eventless) * Probing Ben & Roman to review whether their DISCUSS still hold Regards, it seems that the conclusion is near ;-) -éric From: Robert Moskowitz <[email protected]> Date: Monday, 18 January 2021 at 17:06 To: Eric Vyncke <[email protected]>, Robert Moskowitz <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, Miika Komu <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Danyliw <[email protected]>, Eric Rescorla <[email protected]>, Gonzalo Camarillo <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, Benjamin Kaduk <[email protected]>, Erik Kline <[email protected]>, Adam Wiethuechter <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Need to close all draft-ietf-hip-dex-21 pending issues... before 2021-Jan-13... On 1/18/21 9:12 AM, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote: TD ;LR : more work to be done, deadline this Thursday 21st Bob, Thank you for the -23 (and Adam W for the footwork) and I understand that you are quite busy. Here is the link to the diff between -21 and -23: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-hip-dex-23&url1=draft-ietf-hip-dex-21 (i.e., the one used by July 2020 IESG evaluation and the latest one) After the July 2020 IESG evaluation based on -21, there were a couple of points to be addressed (with some comments of mine as EVY>): 1. Roman: “Section 6.3. Per the definition of IKM, when should these two different derivations be used? " 1. EVY> indeed, IKMm and IKMp are both defined but nothing is said which one to use in which case. IKM IKMm for Master Key SA Input keying material or IKMp for Pair-wise Key SA Input keying material IKMm Kij | I_NONCE IKMp Kij | I_NONCE | (concatenated random values of the ENCRYPTED_KEY parameters in the same order as the HITs with sort(HIT-I | HIT-R)) Seems clear that IKMm is for the Master Key SA and IKMp is for the Pair-wise Key SA. EVY2> Suggest to add a pointer to section 2.3 (definitions) and possibly create entries for the master key SA and pair-wise key SA (perhaps a little extreme though) 2. Roman "discuss-discuss" (read this as request for reply and non-blocking) about " further implementation experience provides better guidance" in sections 6 and 9. 1. EVY> this really pleads for experimental status The only place this text exists anymore is in Appendix C: iESG Considerations Perhaps I should delete it from there. EVY2> you can keep it the appendix, I guess this fixes Roman’s “discuss-discuss” 2. 3. Benjamin on FOLD collisions 1. EVY> IMHO addressed in the new section 3.2.1 I believe I have this covered. We have the Python scripts for tests, but this is a lot of code to put into the document. Right now it is privately held by Adam and I. If called on, we can find some permanent home for it. 2. 4. Benjamin on ACL to counter FOLD collisions in section 3.2.1 1. EVY> still light on the ACL but the above should clear it Sec 7.1 is referenced. 2. 5. Benjamin "how is it known that the peer should be using DEX vs. BEX" 1. EVY> partially addressed in section 1.2 but should be repeated in the security section I can create a sec 9.1 (pushing down the current 9.1): 9.1 Caution on using HIP DEX rather than HIP BEX Due to the substantially reduced security guarantees of HIP DEX compared to HIP BEX, HIP DEX MUST only be used when at least one of the two endpoints is a class 0 or 1 constrained device defined in Section 3 of [RFC7228]). HIP DEX MUST NOT be used when both endpoints are class 2 devices or unconstrained. Will this work? EVY2> it works for me and hopefully for Ben as well 2. 6. Benjamin lack of discussion on the security consequences of inadvertent counter reuse in AES-CTR See sec 9.1 EVY2> Indeed, Ben’s ballot is dated March 2020 on the revision -13. It seems to be fixed to me in the latest revisions. 7. 8. Benjamin "presence of a CSPRNG in order to obtain secure session keys" 9. Security Considerations .... * The strength of the keys for both the Master and Pair-wise Key SAs is based on the quality of the random keying material generated by the Initiator and the Responder. As either peer may be a sensor or an actuator device, there is a natural concern about the quality of its random number generator. Thus at least a CSPRNG SHOULD be used. EVY2> indeed, I should have detected that Ben was not using the -21 but the -13 😉 Now, please expand CSPRNG at first use. 9. 10. Benjamin "usage of CMAC instead of HMAC" about KEYMAT algorithm 1. EVY> new reference to NIST papers seems to address this concern Ben did agree in an email that the SP800-56C and 108 addressed the concern. I did not need to go further. EVY2> if Ben was happy, then I am happy. Thank you for the information. 2. 11. Ekr’s one about why forfeiting FS when some algorithm could do it in a reasonable time. In an email to authors and ADs, Eric R. wrote “it defines a set of parameters (the NIST curves) which are slower w/o FS than other parameters (X25519) are w/ FS. This fact calls into question the need to dispense with FS.” 1. EVY> the additional section 1.2.1 and the reference to a paywall EfficientECC reference do not offer a conclusive motivation for an IETF standards w/o FS. Paywall? Hmm. I got it free. I will have to check into this. It may be to some cookie I have on this system. Or the DOI has the wrong URL. Ah, that URL works for me because I am an IACR member. For all else: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10623-015-0087-1 So I will change the reference. But please check this out. I tried it on another machine that should not have my IACR cookies, but... 2. ***Bottom line, the document is not yet ready to be approved.*** (even if big progress has been made) As written in November (see below), the situation has lingered for too long and is blocking the HIP-NAT and rfc4423-bis documents. *** Therefore, I request the authors for a revised I-D addressing the above (and noting again that a change to ‘experimental’ – as there are no deployed implementations – could probably fix all of them) before Thursday 21st of January midnight UTC else I will ask the HIPSEC WG to agree removing the HIP-DEX section from the architecture document. *** Does the above address the open items? All in all, there have been a couple of significant changes (I_NONCE, some deleted ciphers) since the IETF last call (see https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-hip-dex-23&url1=draft-ietf-hip-dex-21 ), so, another IETF Last Call is required but should not be a real problem. -éric From: Robert Moskowitz <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> Date: Thursday, 14 January 2021 at 16:08 To: Eric Vyncke <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, "[email protected]"<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, "[email protected]"<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, Miika Komu <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> Cc: Roman Danyliw <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, Eric Rescorla <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, Gonzalo Camarillo <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, "[email protected]"<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, Benjamin Kaduk <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]>, Erik Kline <[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Need to close all draft-ietf-hip-dex-21 pending issues... before 2021-Jan-13... I had hoped to get -23 out end of last week, and missed my cutoff. I am now in IACR's Real World Crypto, where I have gotten a couple pointers for DRIP work. I was waiting for two analyzes that I got Jan 4, and incorporating them in. I believe these SHOULD address much of EKR's questions. I will have a run of 1M DEX random HIs to HITs generated with no duplicates that I add in an Appendix along with the Python code. I am adding a BEX/DEX crypto cost into 1.2, probably 1.2.1: For an Initiator, BEX is: 2 PK sig varifications. 1 PK sig generation. 1 DH keypair generation. 1 DH secret derivation. DEX is: 1 DH secret derivation. I have cycles for these and a paper to reference, except ECDH keypair generation, on an 8 bit process and the numbers are big. But I think that part belongs in an Appendix. So unlikely Friday. But early the following week. On 1/12/21 6:19 AM, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote: Two months after the email below, I sending a kind reminder to authors and WG. With the -22, a lot of (if not all ) SEC ADs’ DISCUSS points should have been addressed. As far as I can tell, the other remaining issue was Ekr’s one about why forfeiting FS when some algorithm could do it in a reasonable time. In an email to authors and ADs, Eric R. wrote “it defines a set of parameters (the NIST curves) which are slower w/o FS than other parameters (X25519) are w/ FS. This fact calls into question the need to dispense with FS.” While 2 months ago I put a deadline for tomorrow, I (as the responsible AD) am flexible of course but we cannot linger anymore. I know that a -23 is in the work for weeks => let’s publish it in the coming days. Else, next week we will need to either change the intended status to experimental or declare the document dead by lack of energy. The latter does not have my preference obviously. Regards -éric From: Hipsec mailto:[email protected] on behalf of "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" mailto:[email protected] Date: Friday, 13 November 2020 at 15:32 To: mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected], mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected], Robert Moskowitz mailto:[email protected], Miika Komu mailto:[email protected] Cc: Roman Danyliw mailto:[email protected], Eric Rescorla mailto:[email protected], Gonzalo Camarillo mailto:[email protected], mailto:[email protected] mailto:[email protected], Benjamin Kaduk mailto:[email protected], Erik Kline mailto:[email protected] Subject: [Hipsec] Need to close all draft-ietf-hip-dex-21 pending issues... before 2021-Jan-13... Dear HIP, dear authors, This document was requested for publication [1] in February 2018 (2.5 years ago), then its IESG evaluation has been deferred, then I took over this document from Terry Manderson in March 2019, then it went again through IESG evaluation in July 2020 and there are still DISCUSS points to be addressed even after a couple of revised I-D... Difficult not to observe that this document does not progress very fast. Moreover, this document is a normative reference for rfc4423-bis waiting in the RFC editor queue since March 2019... So, also blocking the HIP-NAT document [2]. After discussion with the HIP chair, Gonzalo in cc, we have taken the following decision: if a revised I-D addressing remaining DISCUSS points + Ekr’s ones is not uploaded within 2 months (13th of January 2021), then I will request the HIP WG to accept the complete removal of section A.3.3 of the rfc4423-bis document (1 page about HIP-DEX in the appendix) + the reference to the HIP-DEX document [3]. This will allow the immediate publication of the rfc4423-bis and HIP-NAT documents. The HIP DEX authors may also select to change the intended status of the document to ‘experimental’ (if the HIP WG agrees) as this may reduce the security requirements by the SEC AD and Ekr. Gonzalo and I are still hoping to get a revised HIP-DEX shortly, Regards -éric [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-dex/history/ [2] https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C386 [3] and possibly I will set the state of HIP-DEX as ‘dead’ on the datatracker -- Robert Moskowitz Owner HTT Consulting C: 248-219-2059 F: 248-968-2824 E: mailto:[email protected] There's no limit to what can be accomplished if it doesn't matter who gets the credit
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