Hello Jacob Bachmeyer schrieb am 2024-12-06:
> Better solution: never sign a document exactly as presented to you; always > make a small change first. This could be as simple as including a nonce in > the signature. Correct – if the change or nonce is big and random enough (at least about 80 bit of randomness to compensate for the lost 80 bits of security due to the birthday attack, even if that is not a real compensation for multiple reasons), i.e. make many small or few big changes to the content. But the normal user does not know. > This is from Schneier's /Applied Cryptography/ from many years ago: this > problem (and its solution) is old. Absolutely correct. It is a great book. But most people do not even see the problem. Best regards -- Rainer Perske Systemdienste + Leiter der Zertifizierungsstelle (UCAM) -- Universität Münster CIT - Center for Information Technology Rainer Perske, Systemdienste Röntgenstraße 7-13, Raum 006 48149 Münster Tel.: +49 251 83-31582 E-Mail: [email protected] Website: www.uni-muenster.de/IT Universitätszertifizierungsstelle Münster (UCAM): Tel.: +49 251 83-31590 E-Mail: [email protected] WWW: www.uni-muenster.de/CA YouTube: youtube.com/@uni_muenster Instagram: instagram.com/uni_muenster LinkedIn: linkedin.com/school/university-of-muenster Facebook: facebook.com/unimuenster
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