On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:00:48AM +0200, René Scharfe wrote:
> Overflow is defined for unsigned integers, but not for signed ones.
> Make the ring buffer index in sha1_to_hex() unsigned to be on the
> safe side.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rene Scharfe <[email protected]>
> ---
> Hard to trigger, but probably even harder to diagnose once someone
> somehow manages to do it on some uncommon architecture.
Indeed. If we are worried about overflow, we would also want to assume
that it wraps at a multiple of 4, but that is probably a sane
assumption.
> diff --git a/hex.c b/hex.c
> index ab2610e..8c6c189 100644
> --- a/hex.c
> +++ b/hex.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ char *oid_to_hex_r(char *buffer, const struct object_id
> *oid)
>
> char *sha1_to_hex(const unsigned char *sha1)
> {
> - static int bufno;
> + static unsigned int bufno;
> static char hexbuffer[4][GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ + 1];
> return sha1_to_hex_r(hexbuffer[3 & ++bufno], sha1);
> }
I wonder if just truncating bufno would be conceptually simpler (albeit
longer):
bufno++;
bufno &= 3;
return sha1_to_hex_r(hexbuffer[bufno], sha1);
You could also write the second line like:
bufno %= ARRAY_SIZE(hexbuffer);
which is less magical (right now the set of buffers must be a power of
2). I expect the compiler could turn that into a bitmask itself.
I'm fine with any of the options. I guess you'd want a similar patch for
find_unique_abbrev on top of jk/no-looking-at-dotgit-outside-repo.
-Peff
