-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 15/09/14 07:59 PM, Rich Freeman wrote: > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Gordon Pettey > <petteyg...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Even if you wanted to burn the money to find that magical >> collision that actually contains working code, you've still got >> to somehow propagate that to other repositories, since they'll >> just ignore it for having the same hash as an already-existing >> object. >> > > Well, if you're willing to trust that nobody is able to tamper > with repositories, then you don't need gpg signatures in the first > place. > > I think that gpg signatures protected by an SHA1 hash provide > fairly little security - a chain is as strong as its weakest link > and sha1 has been considered fairly weak for years now. > > However, I think it does make sense to at least get gpg into the > workflow in the hopes that some day git will move to a stronger > hash, and since it isn't a huge hardship to do so. > > I wouldn't make too light of the use of SHA1 though. As you point > out simply exploiting it isn't enough, but the whole reason for > having signatures is to make an attack on a central repository > useless. Having gpg on top of ssh keys and all that is obviously > redundant, but that is the whole point of it. > > -- Rich >
If the issue preventing protection is that the gpg signature only signs the hash, couldn't we just make repoman automatically add to the bottom of the comment a clearsign on the contents of the commit? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlQYPskACgkQ2ugaI38ACPDjowEAmfMQePUgmLSDrmKyXxdUfbil g6KVaPkL1yfDwrLP7J8BAK+g5MMCMDgH9wDzEHIYerDi9ZIm39AfwazQF3mz3dPR =slAr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
